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THE UNDERMINING INFLUENCE OF THE
FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY ON CAPITAL
POLICYMAKING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ADMINISTRATION IN THE STATES
EILEEN M. CONNOR*
This Article investigates the dynamic relationship between the federal
death penalty and the administration of criminal justice and capital
sentencing in the states. As currently administered, the federal death
penalty is used to attain death sentences against defendants in states where
the death penalty is not available, where the state prosecution has resulted
in a sentence less than death, or where a state death sentence has been
overturned on appeal. The author argues that this practice obstructs the
ability of, and obscures the incentives for, individual states to set criminal
justice policy within their respective territorial jurisdictions, and
furthermore that this tendency is manifestly out of step with constitutional
norms surrounding the death penalty. Examining the constitutional
doctrines of the Commerce Clause, double jeopardy, equal protection, and
the Sixth Amendment, the author finds that none offers a meaningful
limitation on the operation of the federal death penalty where dual
jurisdiction exists. The differing experiences of the federal government and
several states with determinate sentencing systems are used to expose the
institutional features that act as limitations on the ability of Congress to set
criminal justice policy. States are currently reexamining the use of capital
punishment in the face of rising costs, increasing budget deficits, and
concerns about the fair administration of the death penalty. In contrast, the
federal government, which does not possess a general police power and is
not the primary enforcer of criminal law, is insensitive to cost and unlikely
to engage in meaningful debate regarding the rationale for capital
punishment. Furthermore, the current use of the federal death penalty as a
* John J. Gibbons Fellow in Public Interest and Constitutional Law, Gibbons P.C. The
views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of
her employer. The author wishes to acknowledge the careful and thoughtful assistance of
the editors and staff at the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, which has contributed
greatly to this article.
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backstop to state sentencing regimes is out of step with constitutional
principles governing capital sentencing. In addition to creating the
potential for unfairness to individual defendants, the presence of the federal
death penalty undermines state actors from legislators to district attorneys
and jurors. The author concludes that a due regard for the primary role of
the states in criminal justice administration suggests that federal restraint,
in the form of a statutory adoption of a rule akin to the Department of
Justice’s current “Petite Policy,” is in order.
I. INTRODUCTION
When Ronell Wilson was sentenced to death by a federal judge in the
Eastern District of New York in March of 2007,1 it was the first federal
death sentence obtained in New York City in over fifty years.2 Wilson was
originally charged with capital murder in state court,3 but after New York’s
high court invalidated the state’s death penalty in 2004,4 the Staten Island
District Attorney requested that federal prosecutors take over the case.5 The
federal interest in the case was not obvious—Wilson was accused of
murdering two undercover New York City Police Department officers
investigating an illegal weapons ring in Staten Island. The investigation
was not part of a joint federal-state task force, and the murder case was
investigated by local law enforcement, and cooperating witnesses were
given deals in state, not federal court.6 The clear motivation for the transfer
was that the death penalty was not available in state court.
Unsurprisingly, the decision of the Staten Island district attorney to
seek the death penalty against Wilson was widely supported by the local
law enforcement community,7 who were a visible presence at the federal
1
Wilson was tried before and sentenced by Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis. United States v.
Wilson, 493 F. Supp. 2d 537 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
2
Michael Brick, Jury Agrees on Death Sentence for the Killer of Two Detectives, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at A1. At least fourteen defendants had faced the federal death penalty
in the city since its reintroduction. Id.
3
Shaila K. Dewan, Death Penalty to Be Sought in the Killing of Two Detectives, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2003, at B2.
4
People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 367-69 (N.Y. 2004) (holding that unconstitutional
jury instruction rendered statutory scheme invalid absent legislative amendment).
5
Michele Morgan Bolton, Killer’s Sentence Sparks a Debate, TIMES UNION (Albany,
N.Y.), Feb. 1, 2007, at A1.
6
Jeff Harrell, For 2 Who Helped Nail Cop Killer, Minimum Sentences, STATEN ISLAND
ADVANCE, May 9, 2007, at A4 (reporting state sentences of Jessie Jacobus and Mitchell
Diaz).
7
See Daryl Khan, Cops Hail DA’s Death Decision, NEWSDAY (Queens), July 31, 2003,
at A7, available at 2003 WLNR 930263 (“When the hearing was over and Ronell Wilson
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trial.8 Critics characterized the federal prosecution as an “end run” around
the New York law,9 whereas others saw the federal capital trial as
expressing the conscience of the community where the laws of the state
failed to adequately provide for such expression.10 When the federal jury,
which was drawn from a geographical area including but not limited to
Staten Island,11 returned a death verdict, Staten Island Borough President
James Molinaro commended the decision and opined that “[t]he vast
majority of New Yorkers support capital punishment for the most heinous
acts of murder.”12
As Wilson and other cases demonstrate, capital punishment gives rise
to tensions between federal and state values. Increases in the quantity and
scope of federal criminal legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause have made federal law nearly coextensive with state law such that
virtually every murder may be charged by both authorities. The death
penalty is available very broadly under federal law, whereas in some states
it is not available, not imposed, or more difficult to obtain when sought. In
practice, the number of federal capital prosecutions remains low, and the
vast majority of homicide prosecutions are undertaken by state criminal
justice systems.13 However, the impact of the federal death penalty is
knew for certain he was potentially facing the death penalty, . . . applause erupted from the
roughly 40 police officers, detectives and family members who had gathered to pay
witness.”).
8
See John Marzuli, Judge Nixes NYPD Blue at Trial of Accused Cop Killer, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 5, 2006, at 8 (reporting ruling of Judge Garaufis banning uniformed police
officers from courtroom).
9
Michelle M. Bolton, Killer’s Sentence Sparks a Debate: Death Penalty Foes Say
Prosecutors in Police Murders Ducked Law, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), Feb. 1, 2007, at
A1.
10
See Editorial, Justice for Slain Heroes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 30, 2007, at 34
(characterizing Wilson’s crime as “precisely the type of crime that the death penalty is meant
to address” and noting that because of “the failure of the New York Legislature to repair
New York’s capital punishment statute—which it could easily do—the only place such
crimes can be properly addressed is in federal court”).
11
The U.S. Attorney characterized the federal jury as “from this community.” Brick,
supra note 2.
12
Office of the Borough President, Staten Island, B.P. Molinaro Commends Brooklyn
Federal Jury on Capital Punishment for Ronell Wilson (Feb. 1, 2007), available at
http://statenislandusa.com/2007/wilson.html.
13
The most recent statistics made available by the federal government indicate that
federal prosecutors investigated 661 murder suspects in 2005. See MARK MOTIVANS,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2005—
STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.2.1 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/
fjsst/2005/tables/fjs05st201.htm. The Federal Bureau of Investigation estimates the number
of homicides committed in the United States at large for that year at 16,692. See FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2005 tbl.1
(2006), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_01.html. Thus, the federal government
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greater than these numbers suggest, as the potential for federal prosecution
alters the behavior of state-level criminal justice actors in a number of
ways.
An abundance of scholarship addresses the consequences of increased
federal criminal jurisdiction on local actors and individual criminal
defendants. Likewise, an enormous body of literature examines the
constitutional underpinnings and attributes of the modern death penalty
regime. However, little attention has been paid to the dynamic relationship
between federal criminal law in general, the federal death penalty, and the
administration of criminal justice and capital sentencing in the states.
This Article addresses this dynamic relationship and argues that the
federal death penalty obstructs the ability of and obscures the incentives for
individual states to set criminal justice policy within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, and furthermore that this tendency is manifestly out
of step with constitutional norms surrounding the death penalty. Part II.A
provides an overview of the current federal death penalty and the policy of
the Department of Justice, which guides the use of prosecutorial discretion
in relation to concurrent federal-state jurisdiction in homicide cases. Part
II.B details a selection of recent federal cases, which suggest that federal
prosecutions are being undertaken not to vindicate uniquely federal
interests, but rather to achieve death sentences where the state prosecution
would yield, at a maximum, a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. At times, federal prosecutions are undertaken at the
behest of state and local authorities, and at other times, they are in conflict
with local norms. Part III examines several constitutional doctrines and
finds that they are insufficient to resolve the individual rights and sovereign
interests implicated by certain federal death penalty prosecutions. In
particular, jurisprudence under the Double Jeopardy Clause recognizes the
dual sovereignty doctrine, by which successive federal-state prosecutions
are permissible. In the capital context, this means that a defendant may be
acquitted or sentenced to life in state court and then prosecuted capitally by
federal authorities. Although dual criminal jurisdiction is an enduring
component of our federal system, the present calibration of federal criminal
power vis-à-vis the states is predicated on an outdated norm that assigns to

was involved in the investigation (although not necessarily the prosecution) of less than 4%
of all murders in the United States for that year. The United States Department of Justice
concurs that “the vast majority of homicides in the Untied [sic] States, like most violent
crimes, are investigated exclusively by local police officers working hand-in-hand with local
prosecutors, who file charges against defendants in state courts.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL SURVEY 1988-2000 4 (2000),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/dpsurvey.html [hereinafter DOJ STATISTICAL
SURVEY].
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states obstructionist intentions with respect to federal law enforcement
priorities. However, the modern landscape is one of collaboration. Part IV
examines the institutional features of Congress that impact its capacity to
enact rational criminal justice legislation and argues that the respective
states are better able to set a rational criminal justice policy that is truly
reflective of community norms. Part V argues that the overlapping
jurisdiction of federal and state death penalty law is inconsistent with
constitutional principles governing capital sentencing. The potential for
federal capital prosecution nationwide threatens to undermine seriously the
ability of states to make reasoned policy choices for the benefit of their
citizenry, the ability of local prosecutors to remain accountable for their
charging decisions, and the capacity of local juries to breathe normative and
moral values into the substance of capital law. Finally, Part VI suggests
that federal enactment of an abstention rule similar to the non-binding
policy currently operative within the Department of Justice is the best
means to address the concerns raised in Part V.
II. THE SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL INTEREST IN THE DEATH PENALTY
The federal government has in recent years broadened the reach of its
capital punishment regime.14 This expansion, as discussed infra, is
attributable to an increase in federal statutes authorizing the death penalty
for particular crimes and, in part, an increased willingness on the part of
recent Attorneys General to pursue federal capital prosecutions.
The policy considerations facing Congress and federal law
enforcement officials are quite distinct from those that impact the states. In
addition to the need to consider how to best vindicate federal interests and
effectuate national law enforcement policy, the federal government must
consider that its criminal jurisdiction often overlaps with that of the states.
Part II.A provides a brief overview of federal statutory law regarding the
death penalty and outlines the Department of Justice’s internal procedures
regarding which cases will be selected for capital prosecution. Part II.B
provides examples of recent capital prosecutions in which federal
prosecution overlapped and, at times, conflicted with state criminal
jurisdiction, and argues that the Department’s procedures do not provide a
clear principle for resolving these conflicts.

14

Between 1988, the year in which the federal death penalty was reintroduced, and 1994,
the federal government initiated forty-seven capital prosecutions. DOJ STATISTICAL SURVEY,
supra note 13, at 8. Between 1995 and 2000, that number grew to 159. Id.
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A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL STATUTES AND POLICY
GOVERNING THE DEATH PENALTY

The increasing frequency of federal capital prosecutions and expansion
of death-eligible offenses under federal law is in line with the welldocumented, expansive trend in general federal criminal law.15
Commentators have explored the implications of this expansion for the
calibration of power in our federalist system.16 Prior to the last third of the
twentieth century, the bulk of federal criminal law was directed at conduct
that was particularly or inherently federal in nature—crimes against the
sovereignty of the federal government, such as treason, and crimes
involving national currency, borders, land, or territories.17 Almost by
definition, the conduct proscribed in a truly national crime was beyond the
reach of state criminal statutes or enforcement capabilities.
This
arrangement was in harmony with fundamental precepts regarding the
balance of power between the constituent parts of our federal system.
Traditionally, states are the protectors of the public health and welfare of
their citizens, whereas the Constitution did not grant to the federal
government a general police power.18 Yet given the current expanded
15
See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW,
THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1998) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT];
Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L.
REV. 789 (1996); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the
Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995).
16
See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 5 (“The fundamental view that
local crime is, with rare exception, a matter for the states to attack has been strained in
practice in recent years. Congressional activity making essentially local conduct a federal
crime has accelerated greatly, notably in areas in which existing state law already
criminalizes the same conduct.”); Ashdown, supra note 15, at 813 ( “Wholesale federal
criminalization and enforcement of local crime heads the country in the direction that the
framers of the Constitution wanted to avoid—the creation of a strong and pervasive national
police and criminal justice system.”); Beale, supra note 15, at 993 (“The current increase in
federal criminal jurisdiction is in fundamental tension with the values of decentralization
promoted by federalism.”).
17
See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 46 (detailing typical federal criminal
legislation that addresses “crimes interfering with the core functions of the federal
government: treason, controlling national borders, and protecting government currency” and
legislation “based on a federal relationship to the site of the crime”).
18
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (“[T]he Constitution . . .
withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power.”); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,
635 (1993) (explaining that in our federal system, “[t]he States possess primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law”) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128
(1982)); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) (“It goes without saying that
preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the
Federal Government.”); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) (plurality opinion)
(“Our national government is one of delegated powers alone. . . . [T]he administration of
criminal justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of [its]

2010]

INFLUENCE OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY

155

scope of federal criminal law, this precept is observed more often in the
breach, as courts have upheld federal criminal statute upon federal criminal
statute as valid exercises of Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause.19 A consequence of this expanded and expansive federal criminal
jurisdiction is that virtually every homicide is potentially punishable by the
federal government, even those that are purely local and thus seemingly at
the core of the quintessential local police power.20
Three federal legislative enactments compose the modern federal death
penalty. Following the Supreme Court’s invalidation of all death penalty
statutes in Furman v. Georgia in 1972,21 the United States did not reinstate
the death penalty for federal offenses until 1988 with the passage of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act.22 The availability of the federal death penalty
expanded further with the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, which contained the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA).23 The
FDPA prescribes procedures for implementing the death penalty in relation
to over sixty substantive crimes.24 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
delegated powers, has created offenses against the United States.”); cf. United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that reading the Commerce Clause
to allow Congress to regulate intrastate, noncommercial activity would confer upon
Congress a general police power).
19
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 41 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (voting to
uphold a portion of the Controlled Substances Act that criminalizes the growing of
marijuana for personal consumption against a Commerce Clause challenge while affirming
the principle that Congress may not regulate purely local activity); United States v. Patton,
451 F.3d 615 (10th Cir. 2006) (upholding federal law prohibiting felons from possessing
body armor); United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2006) (upholding federal
prohibition on intrastate possession of child pornography).
20
See, e.g., United States v. Claiborne, 92 F. Supp. 2d 503, 509 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“[T]he
Commerce Clause has been broadly expanded and the line between federal and state crimes
has been blurred to allow virtually every crime to be prosecuted in federal court under the
auspice of ‘affecting interstate commerce.’”); accord Bob Egelko, S.F. Grapples with 1st
Death Trials in Years, S.F. CHRON. Mar. 1, 2009, at B1 (quoting former federal prosecutor
Rory Little as saying: “[t]here’s no case where there’s a homicide that you couldn’t charge
as a federal death penalty if you worked hard enough.”).
21
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (2006)). The Act made the crime of “continuing
criminal enterprise” death-eligible. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (2006).
23
18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3599 (2006).
24
A non-exhaustive list of the federal crimes that carry the death penalty include murder
related to the smuggling of aliens, 8 U.S.C § 1342 (2006); destruction of an aircraft, motor
vehicle, or related facilities resulting in death, 18 U.S.C. §§ 32-34 (2006); murder committed
during a drug-related drive-by shooting, 18 U.S.C. § 36 (2006); retaliatory murder of a
member of the immediate family of law enforcement officials, 18 U.S.C. § 115(b)(3) (2006)
(cross referencing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1113, 1117 (2006)); civil rights offenses resulting in
death, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245, 247 (2006); death resulting from offenses involving
transportation of explosives, destruction of government property related to foreign or
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Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) added four more crimes to the list of deatheligible federal offenses.25 It cannot be said that the majority of these
crimes reach criminal conduct directed against the United States as an
entity, nor can it be said that the substantive crimes describe behavior that is
not proscribed by the criminal codes of each of the fifty states. For
example, among the most frequently charged federal capital crimes are the
use of a gun to commit homicide during and in relation to a crime of
violence or drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), murder in aid
of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a), and murder in
furtherance of a continuing criminal narcotics enterprise in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A)—all targeting conduct proscribed by every state.26
That the federal government has the ability to prosecute virtually every
homicide in the United States as a capital crime does not, of course, mean
that it does or will, or that the states have been supplanted as the primary
prosecutors of human-on-human violence.27 Since 1988, the Attorney
General of the United States has authorized capital prosecutions against 441
defendants.28 This number represents a tiny fraction of cases in which the
federal government could assert its criminal jurisdiction and charge an
offense that carries the death penalty.

interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 844(d), (f), (i) (2006); murder committed by the use of a
firearm during a crime of violence or a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(5)(B)(i)
(2006); first-degree murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006); murder of a foreign official, official
guest, or internationally protected person, 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (2006); murder by a federal
prisoner, 18 U.S.C. § 1118 (2006); murder of a state or local law enforcement official or
other person aiding in a federal investigation or murder of a state correctional officer, 18
U.S.C. § 1121 (2006); murder during a kidnapping, 18 U.S.C § 1201 (2006); murder during
a hostage taking, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006); mailing of injurious articles with intent to kill or
resulting in death, 18 U.S.C. § 1716 (2006); use of interstate commerce facilities in the
commission of murder for hire, 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2006); bank-robbery-related murder or
kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2006); murder in aid of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1959 (2006); murder related to a carjacking, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006); murder related to a
rape or child molestation, 18 U.S.C. § 2245 (2006); murder committed during an offense
against maritime navigation, 18 U.S.C. § 2280 (2006); murder by the use of a weapon of
mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2006); murder involving torture, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A
(2006); and murder related to a continuing criminal enterprise or related murder of a federal,
state, or local law enforcement official, 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (2006). Non-homicide capital
crimes include espionage, 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2006); treason, 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006); and
trafficking in large quantities of drugs, 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b) (2006).
25
See DOJ STATISTICAL SURVEY, supra note 13, at 1.
26
See id. at 13.
27
See supra note 13.
28
Current information on the charging practices of the federal government may be found
on the Death Penalty Information Center website. Death Penalty Information Center,
Federal Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-penalty (last visited
Nov. 11, 2009).
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One factor acting as a restraint on the number of federal criminal
prosecutions is the Department of Justice’s centralized review process.
Unlike state-level county prosecutors, the United States Attorneys of the
ninety-three judicial districts spanning the fifty states, Puerto Rico, Guam,
the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands are not autonomous
actors when it comes to capital prosecutions. Should a United States
Attorney wish to prosecute a defendant capitally, he or she must submit a
memorandum to the Attorney General’s Review Committee on Capital
Cases (known as the Capital Review Committee). The Attorney General
makes the final decision about whether to seek the death penalty,29 and once
the Capital Review Committee has authorized a capital prosecution, the
United States Attorney must seek permission from the Attorney General to
reduce the charges.30 The ultimate decision rests with the Attorney General,
who may override the local prosecutor’s preference.31
An express goal of this centralized authorization policy is to achieve
uniformity in charging decisions across jurisdictions:
National consistency requires treating similar cases similarly, when the only material
difference is the location of the crime. Reviewers in each district are understandably
most familiar with local norms or practice in their district and State, but reviewers
32
must also take care to contextualize a given case within national norms or practice.

Thus, department policy requires that each decision to seek or not to seek
the death penalty “be set within a framework of consistent and even-handed
national application of Federal capital sentencing laws.”33 The Capital
Review Committee is populated with an eye toward national uniformity.
According to departmental testimony presented to the United States Senate:
“The Committee members were selected based on their abilities to

29

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-10.040 (2007),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam [hereinafter
USAM].
30
Id. § 9-10.150 (“Once the Attorney General has authorized the United States Attorney
to seek the death penalty, the United States Attorney may not withdraw a notice of intention
to seek the death penalty filed with the district court unless authorized by the Attorney
General.”).
31
Id. § 9-10.150 (“The United States Attorney should base the withdrawal request on
material changes in the facts and circumstances of the case from those that existed at the
time of the initial determination . . . . In all cases, the Attorney General shall make the final
decision on whether to authorize the withdrawal of a notice of intention to seek the death
penalty.”).
32
Id. § 9-10.130.B.
33
Id. § 9-10.030.
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synthesize facts and to fairly and uniformly evaluate arguments regarding
the application of the Federal death penalty statutes.”34
Uniformity and consistency in capital charging decisions are laudable
goals, especially given that modern death penalty jurisprudence posits
arbitrariness as the chief vice against which the Eighth Amendment
guards.35 The virtue of the Capital Review Committee is that by allowing
the same group of individuals to review and issue recommendations on
most potentially capital federal cases,36 some consistency may be achieved.
Yet, aside from this procedure, the substantive values by which the
committee makes its determinations are under-articulated,37 especially in
light of the expanse of territory and citizenry over which the Department
presides and the virtually unlimited scope of federal criminal jurisdiction.
The Department concedes that “Federal law enforcement resources and
Federal judicial resources are not sufficient to permit prosecution of every
alleged offense over which Federal jurisdiction exists.”38
A separate policy relating to dual state and federal jurisdiction
provides some further principles. Departmental policy dictates that scarce
federal resources are not to be expended where state law targets federally
proscribed conduct and enforcement of state law is thorough and effective.39
In such instances of overlapping jurisdiction, a federal prosecution should
34

See Oversight of the Federal Death Penalty: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Const. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 38-62 (2007) [hereinafter Federal
Death Penalty Hearing] (responses of Department of Justice to questions submitted by
Senator Feingold).
35
The concern over arbitrariness led the Supreme Court to find Georgia’s capital
punishment statute unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual . . . . [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that
permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed.”); Id. at 313 (White, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most
atrocious of crimes . . . . There is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which it is imposed from the many in which it is not.”); Id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(“A penalty . . . should be considered ‘unusually’ imposed if it is administered arbitrarily or
discriminatorily.”).
36
Before issuing an indictment in a case potentially subject to the death penalty (even
where the indictment will be for a lesser offense, or where the death penalty is not sought),
“the United States Attorney is strongly advised, but not required, to consult with the Capital
Case unit.” USAM, supra note 29, § 9-10.050.
37
See John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney
General Should Defer when U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA.
L. REV. 1697, 1698-99 (2003) (gleaning general principles by which the Attorney General
requires U.S. Attorneys to seek death in the absence of formal statement of standards).
38
USAM, supra note 29, § 9-27.230.B.1.
39
Id. § 9-27.220.A.2.
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be undertaken “only when the Federal interest in the prosecution is more
substantial than the interests of the State or local authorities.”40 The interest
of the state in prosecution of the offense is indicated in the nature of the
offense, identity of the offender or victim, and the amount of investigative
resources already devoted by the state.41 The federal interest may be
heightened where the criminal activity reached beyond the boundaries of a
single local prosecutorial jurisdiction42 and where the “ability and
willingness of the State to prosecute effectively and obtain an appropriate
punishment upon conviction” is lacking.43
The policy supports federal prosecution where a state is unlikely to
obtain an “appropriate punishment.” What exactly is considered to be
appropriate punishment is not defined, but by inference, this phrase must
relate to the severity of the sentence. Because federal prosecution aimed at
correcting a state sentence deemed inappropriate for its severity would be
an absurd use of resources and ultimately inconsequential—since the more
lenient federal punishment will not prevent the state from executing its
sentence—the import of the policy is that federal prosecutions are utilized
when the array of potential state sentences is deemed too lenient.
The concept of “appropriate punishment” is mirrored in the
Department’s policy regarding successive federal-state prosecutions.
Because the Double Jeopardy Clause allows a federal prosecution following
a state prosecution,44 the federal government may initiate a second
prosecution in order to vindicate a substantial federal interest. Such
prosecutions are governed by a second discretionary policy, the “Petite
Policy.”45 The purposes of this policy are (1) to “protect persons charged
with criminal conduct from the burdens associated with multiple
prosecutions or punishments for substantially the same act(s) or
transaction(s)”; (2) to allow for the “vindicat[ion] of substantial federal
interests through appropriate federal prosecutions”; (3) to promote efficient
use of departmental resources; and (4) to facilitate federal-state cooperation
in law enforcement.46 The policy requires the prior approval of the
Attorney General “whenever there has been a prior state or federal
prosecution resulting in an acquittal, a conviction, including one resulting
from a plea agreement, or a dismissal or other termination of the case on the

40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. § 9-10.090.
See id. § 9-10.090.A.
Id. § 9-10.090.B.
Id. § 9-10.090.C.
See infra Part III.B.
USAM, supra note 29, § 9-2.031.
See id. § 9-2.031.A.
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merits after jeopardy has attached.”47 Approval is contingent upon the
satisfaction of three prerequisites:
[F]irst, the matter must involve a substantial federal interest; second, the prior
prosecution must have left that interest demonstrably unvindicated; and third,
applying the same test that is applicable to all federal prosecutions, the government
must believe that the defendant’s conduct constitutes a federal offense, and that the
48
admissible evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.

Although the charging policy speaks of uniformity, this is in tension
with the admittedly limited resources of the federal government and indeed
with the empirical reality of federal criminal prosecutions. Both the capital
charging policy and the Petite Policy imply that a state is capable of
delivering full vindication of federal interests, so long as punishment is
sufficiently severe. Where state laws, policies, or norms favor the same or
greater level of punishment for a certain crime, the local norm is observed,
either by virtue of a federal prosecution whose sentencing outcome is
similar to that which would be attained in a state prosecution, or, more
likely, by federal abstention from prosecution. Where state laws, policies,
or norms favor less punishment, the norm may be supplanted by a
successive or overriding federal prosecution.
B. EXAMPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS

The existence of dual jurisdiction over potentially capital crimes raises
questions about the exact parameters of “appropriate punishment” and the
existence of a “substantial federal interest” in obtaining a particular
sentencing outcome. Some examples of the application of the Department’s
policies in actual cases suggest that in certain instances, in the judgment of
the Department, the only appropriate punishment is a death sentence,
without which the substantial federal interest would be unvindicated.
1. Prosecutions Initiated in Federal Court Where the Death Penalty Is
Unavailable in the State
The federal prosecution of Alan Quinones predated the Ronell Wilson
trial, discussed supra, but was similar in several respects. Quinones was
accused of murdering an undercover New York City Police Department
(NYPD) officer in the Bronx.49 Although Quinones’s criminal behavior fit
within the federal charge of murder in furtherance of a continuing criminal
enterprise, the crime was arguably local: he was a relatively small-time drug
dealer; the victim was part of an NYPD investigative team; the murder was
47
48
49

Id. § 9-2.031.C.
Id. § 9-2.031.A.
United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 292 (2d Cir. 2007).
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in retaliation for an arrest by the NYPD; the murder took place in the Bronx
and was investigated by the NYPD. Capital punishment was (at the time)
available in New York, but the Bronx District Attorney, Robert Johnson,
has a policy of not seeking the death penalty.50 As Johnson is the longest
serving district attorney in Bronx history,51 this policy evidently meets with
local approval, although at times it has been challenged by higher state
authorities. The Governor of New York had successfully removed Johnson
from the trial of another defendant accused of killing an officer of the
NYPD.52 By removing the matter from Johnson’s control, the federal
charges against Quinones obviated the need for a similar political scuffle.
Although the United States Attorney recommended against seeking the
death penalty in the case, the United States Attorney General overrode this
recommendation.53 The Justice Department pursued the capital charge, it
said, in order to ensure consistency of capital punishment across the
country.54 The federal jury convicted Quinones, but he was given only a
life sentence.55
A federal forum afforded the option of a death sentence for Alfonso
Rodriguez, Jr., who was convicted and sentenced to death by a federal jury
in the District of North Dakota.56 The crime had been sensationalized in the
national media; Rodriguez, a convicted sex offender recently released from
prison, was convicted of killing a vivacious white college student whom he

50
Johnson issued a statement in 1995, upon legislative authorization of the death penalty
in New York, declaring his intention not to utilize the death penalty. His reasons included
the fact that, while the “probability of conviction and certainty of punishment” are the best
deterrents of crime, the death penalty is never certain in a given case and therefore resources
are better spent in other criminal justice endeavors. Robert Johnson, Bronx District
Attorney, Statement Regarding New Death Penalty/Life Without Parole Law in New York
State (Mar. 7, 1995), http://bronxda.nyc.gov/fcrime/death.htm.
51
See Bronx District Attorney’s Office, District Attorney’s Biography,
http://bronxda.nyc.gov (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
52
See In re Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E. 2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y. 1997). Johnson called
Governor Pataki’s action “tantamount to the disenfranchisement of the voters of the Bronx.”
Letter from Robert Johnson, Bronx District Attorney, to George Pataki, Governor of New
York (Mar. 20, 1996), available at http://bronxda.nyc.gov/fcrime/death.htm#1g.
53
Julia Preston, Killers Get Life Sentences in Setback to Justice Department, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2004, at B2.
54
Id. (“Justice officials have said they are bringing more capital charges in the New
York region to ensure consistency of capital punishment across the country. No jury has
delivered a federal death penalty sentence in New York State since the penalty was
reinstated in 1988.”).
55
See United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 291 (2d Cir. 2007).
56
United States v. Rodriquez, No. 2:04-cr-55, 2007 WL 466752, at *52 (D. N.D. Feb.
12, 2007).
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had kidnapped from a mall parking lot.57 It was the first death sentence
handed down within the territorial jurisdiction of that state in nearly one
hundred years.58 Similarly, in 2005 Donald Fell received a federal death
sentence for a crime that partially took place in Vermont,59 a state without
the death penalty.60 Notably, Fell was tried only after the Attorney General
rejected his plea agreement with the United States Attorney’s Office for the
District of Vermont.61 His death sentence was the first one delivered by a
jury in Vermont in nearly fifty years.62
2. Simultaneous State and Federal Prosecutions
In Tennessee, two brothers, Robert and Antonio Carpenter, faced dual
murder prosecutions in state and federal court, stemming from the
abduction and murder of a local woman from a fast-food restaurant drive-in
in 1999.63 Federal authorities charged the brothers under the federal
carjacking statute.64 In what was, at the time, a rare occurrence, the United
States Attorney General authorized federal prosecutors to seek the death
penalty against the Carpenter brothers, despite the fact that they were
presently facing the death penalty in state court.65 However, the state
prosecution was on uncertain grounds. Defense attorneys for the Carpenter
brothers, who are African-American, filed a motion to dismiss the capital
charges, predicated on the assertion that District Attorney Elizabeth Rice
engaged in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination in seeking the

57

See Dave Kolpack, Experts: Fiber, DNA Evidence Link Rodriguez and Sjodin,
BISMARCK TRIB., Aug. 23, 2006, at A1.
58
See Chuck Haga & Pam Louwagie, A Wrenching Verdict, STAR TRIB. (Minn.-St. Paul,
MN), Sept. 23, 2006, at A1. North Dakota law does not allow for the death penalty. Id.
59
United States v. Fell, 531 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2008).
60
United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 265-66 (2d Cir. 2009) (Raggi, J., concurring in
denial of reh’g en banc).
61
Id. at 206-07.
62
Strat Douthat & Jenna Russell, Jury Votes Death for Vermont Killer, Sentence Is First
in 50 Years in Vt., BOST. GLOBE, July 15, 2005, at B1.
63
Lawrence Buser, One Brother Wants Trial, the Other Wants to Take Guilty Plea, COM.
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Mar. 11, 2000, at B1.
64
The Carpenter brothers were also charged with using a firearm during a crime of
violence and killing a witness to a federal crime. Michael Erskine, Reno OK’s Seeking Top
U.S. Penalty in Lee Case, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Dec. 29, 1999, at B1. The latter
charge stems from the fact that the victim, Barbara Lee, was rendered unable to testify
regarding the events (the subject of the former charge) resulting in her death. See id.
65
Id. Between the 1994 passage of the omnibus federal crime bill, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994), and the approval of the capital prosecution against the Carpenter
brothers, the Justice Department approved approximately seventy capital prosecutions out of
about 240 instances in which the death penalty had been requested. Id.
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death penalty.66 The federal death penalty was authorized only after the
defense motion was filed.67
In this instance, the federal and state trials proceeded concurrently,
requiring the Carpenters to defend themselves in two forums
simultaneously. The concurrent trials, combined with the federal trial
court’s desire to keep a “crisp” schedule in order to move the case “at a
steady pace,”68 created a logistical nightmare for the defense. On July 23,
1999, Fayette County Circuit Court Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood ordered
the Carpenter brothers to undergo psychiatric exams.69 State prosecutors
requested the exams in order to determine the defendants’ competency to
stand trial, as well as their mental states at the time of the offense.70 At this
time, the Carpenters had not yet been appointed counsel in the state
proceedings,71 but their appointed counsel in the federal proceedings did
complain, in federal court, about the state-ordered psychiatric evaluations.72
Without the ability to intervene in the state proceedings, federal defense
attorneys were left to rely on assurances from state prosecutors, delivered
via federal prosecutors, that the state evaluation would not take place for a
month, leaving state defense attorneys (once appointed) enough time to
contest the order issued by the state judge.73 Ultimately, the Carpenters
pleaded guilty to lesser charges in federal court.74 In state court, Robert
Carpenter was declared mentally retarded and thus ineligible for the death
penalty.75 Antonio Carpenter was found guilty of first-degree murder
largely on the basis of his federal plea, which was entered as evidence
66
Bartholomew Sullivan, Carpenter’s Lawyers Try to Kill Death-Penalty Plans, COM.
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Sept. 25, 1999, at B1. Available records suggested that all
twenty-three defendants against whom Rice had sought the death penalty in the previous five
years were African-American. She had never filed a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty against a white defendant. Id.
67
See id.
68
Tom Bailey Jr., Lee Murder Case Trial Gets Nov. 15 Start Date, COM. APPEAL
(Memphis, Tenn.), Sept. 1, 1999, at A7.
69
See Tom Bailey Jr., State Judge Delays Psychiatric Tests for Carpenters, COM.
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), July 29, 1999, at A16.
70
Tom Bailey Jr., Collierville Carjacking Gets Long-Distance Attention, COM. APPEAL
(Memphis, Tenn.), July 28, 1999, at B1.
71
See Bailey, supra note 68. On July 28, Judge Blackwood appointed Stephen Hale to
represent Robert Carpenter and Thomas Minor to represent Antonio Carpenter. Id.
72
Id.; see also Bailey, supra note 70.
73
Bailey, supra note 70.
74
Tom Bailey Jr., Carjack Defense Fails; Carpenter Convicted Again, COM. APPEAL
(Memphis, Tenn.), July 21, 2000, at B1.
75
Michael Erskine, Judge Rules Brother Can’t Face Death in Fatal Carjack: He’s
Retarded, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Apr. 28, 2000, at B1. Psychologists testified that
Carpenter’s IQ was in the mid-60s. Id.
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against him in state court,76 but the jury rejected the death penalty and
instead sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole.77
3. Federal Prosecutions Following Reversal of State Convictions
In other instances, federal capital prosecutions have been initiated only
after state convictions have been reversed in the state appellate process for
Fourth Amendment violations. In North Carolina, Richard Jackson was
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, but the North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the grounds that
Jackson’s confession should not have been admitted at his trial because
local police officers continued to question Jackson after he invoked his right
to counsel.78 On remand, Jackson entered a plea and avoided a death
sentence in North Carolina but was subsequently indicted on similar federal
charges. Although Jackson objected to the admission in federal district
court of evidence that had been collected by authorities after his state court
plea—Jackson argued that federal authorities were moved to prosecute him
vindictively on the basis of statements and interviews that he had given
while in jail, apparently unaware of their potential use in a subsequent
federal prosecution—he did not object to the admission of his confession in
federal court.79 Thus, the federal court did not need to determine the
voluntariness of Jackson’s confession, the issue on which the state appellate
court had found reversible error. Jackson was convicted and sentenced to
death by a federal jury in 2001.80
The issue that was averted in Jackson’s case arose in the federal
prosecution of Samuel Ealy. Charged in relation to three murders arising
out of a criminal ring led by a local mayor in West Virginia, Ealy was
acquitted of state murder charges in 1991.81 In his subsequent federal trial
on charges arising out of the same underlying facts, the district court
rejected the notion that it was bound to follow the West Virginia court’s
determination that certain evidence had been obtained in violation of Ealy’s
Fourth Amendment rights. Collateral estoppel did not apply because the
federal government was not a party to the state prosecution.82 In
76

Tom Bailey, Jr., Jury Told of Guilty Plea in Carjack, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.),
July 20, 2000, at A13.
77
Tom Bailey Jr., Carpenter Jury Spares His Life, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), July
22, 2000, at B1.
78
State v. Jackson, 497 S.E.2d 409, 412 (N.C. 1998).
79
United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 281 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting, among others,
claim of vindictive prosecution and affirming conviction).
80
Id. at 278.
81
See United States v. Ealy, 363 F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir. 2004).
82
United States v. Ealy, 163 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635 (W.D. Va. 2001).
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determining the issue de novo, the court acknowledged that the legal
principles remained the same, but credited testimony from law enforcement
officers, whereas the state trial court had not.83
4. Federal Prosecution Following State Acquittal
Kenneth Barrett was tried twice in Oklahoma state court on murder
charges before being tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in relation to
the same incident by a federal jury.84
Barrett was a suspected
methamphetamine producer, and state and local authorities joined forces to
investigate him. They executed a “no-knock” search warrant at Barrett’s
property after midnight. During the execution of the warrant, Barrett fatally
shot an Oklahoma Highway Patrol officer in an unmarked vehicle from
inside his house.85 A jury was unable to reach a verdict in his first state
trial, and another jury acquitted him of intentional murder at his second
trial, convicting him instead of a lesser-included offense and sentencing him
to thirty years in state prison.86 A central issue in those trials and in the
subsequent federal trial was whether Barrett was aware that the late night
visitors to his property were in fact police officers and not just run-of-themill trespassers.87 The federal court also had to resolve whether the warrant
violated Oklahoma state law, which required warrants to be executed
between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. absent certain exceptional
circumstances.88
Similarly, Claude Dennis was tried capitally in federal court in relation
to a murder for which he was acquitted in Virginia state court.89 Dennis
was charged with that murder, among others, after a joint federal-state task
force reinvestigated the case.90 Dennis originally faced charges in the 15th
Judicial Circuit of Virginia, which is comprised of the city of Richmond.
83

Id. (“In essence, the state trial judge disbelieved the law enforcement officers as to
their version of the search of the garage. I have heard the evidence, and I find that the
officers are telling the truth about the search. The legal principles remain the same, but my
different view of the evidence causes me to reach an opposite conclusion from the state
judge.”).
84
United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1085 (10th Cir. 2007).
85
Id. at 1084-86.
86
Id. at 1085.
87
Id. at 1083.
88
Id. at 1090-93.
89
United States v. Beckford, 211 F.3d 1266 (4th Cir. 2000).
90
United States v. Beckford, 964 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (E.D. Va. 1997). Dennis was part
of the “Poison Clan,” a Richmond, Virginia gang involved in narcotics distribution. The
Richmond Cold Homicide Task Force was comprised of members of the Richmond Police
Department, the Virginia State Police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and involved
the Commonwealth’s Attorney for the City of Richmond. Id.
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However, the federal jury was drawn from the Eastern District of Virginia,
a much broader area that includes the suburbs of Richmond. As a federal
court noted in a related case, “By bringing the case in federal court, the
United States will likely obtain a jury composition that could not exist in
the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond absent a Batson violation.”91
5. Federal Prosecution When New Evidence Emerges
After State Conviction
Federal authorities again took a second bite at a death sentence in the
case of Brent Simmons, who was convicted for the murder of his exgirlfriend and her boyfriend, both students at James Madison University.
Simmons was charged in a local court in Virginia, but the jury deadlocked
on the issue of guilt. Simmons accepted a plea to second-degree murder
and was sentenced to twenty years in jail.92 Years later, new evidence
emerged that made the case against Simmons stronger.93 State prosecutors
were prevented by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment (as
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment) from reopening the case.
However, federal authorities were able to bring capital charges against
Simmons for the same acts based on anti-stalking provisions of the
Violence Against Women Act.94
* * *
In sum, the above cases indicate that federal prosecutions are not
limited to instances in which the states are unwilling or unable to

91

United States v. Claiborne, 92 F. Supp. 2d 503, 510-12 (E.D. Va. 2000) (citing Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)). Beverly Claiborne’s case, like Claude Dennis’s, was
heard in the Richmond court by a jury that was 75% African-American. The typical jury
pool for the Richmond Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia is approximately 10% African-American. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 36 F.
Supp. 2d 304, 307-08 (E.D. Va. 1999)).
92
Man Agrees to Plea in Two Slayings, WASH. TIMES, May 1, 1998, at C8.
93
Calvin R. Trice, Killer Could Face New Charges, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov.
15, 2002, at B2, available at 2002 WLNR 1467740.
94
Death Sought for Students’ Killer, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, VA), July 30, 2004,
at C5. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce
Clause to provide for civil remedies for gender-based violence as it had done in the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA). See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). But the
criminal anti-stalking provisions of VAWA have sustained similar challenges. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lankford, 196 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1119; United
States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2261 against
Commerce Clause challenge because “Congress may rationally have decided that domestic
violence is a problem of national importance, with a significant effect on interstate
commerce”).
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criminalize and prosecute the underlying conduct.95 Instead, by terms of the
Petite Policy, the state sentences in each of these cases were “insufficient.”
A fair inference is that the federal interest is deemed more substantial than
the state interest when a federal prosecution is more likely to produce a
death sentence.
Congruently, in some instances the federal interest is seemingly
vindicated only by a certain sentencing outcome, regardless of whether a
state prosecution has resulted in a conviction and lengthy sentence. As one
federal judge, critical of the Petite Policy, has written, “I refuse to accept
the notion that the federal interest is to demand convictions rather than
prosecutions. I see nothing in the Constitution or any statute that so defines
our federal interest.”96
III. IN SEARCH OF A LIMITING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
The above examples illustrate that the federal death penalty in practice
does not operate in isolation from state criminal justice systems, nor is it
limited in application to defendants and crimes that raise a peculiarly
federal interest. In some instances, the impact on individuals is manifestly
unfair and intuitively out of step with familiar constitutional norms such as
equal protection and double jeopardy. However, an examination of these
and other constitutional doctrines reveals that none is sufficient to deal with
the contemporary realities of federal and state law enforcement.
A. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

The necessary predicate condition for the present relationship between
federal and state criminal jurisdiction is an interpretation of the Commerce
Clause that deems constitutional all of the criminal legislation passed by
Congress. A federal criminal law that proscribes even purely intrastate,
noneconomic behavior is facially valid so long as Congress, at the time of
enactment, had a rational basis for concluding that such behavior, taken in
the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.97 For example,
although the Supreme Court articulated a limit on the ability of Congress to
proscribe the possession of a gun within a school zone,98 that limitation
does not prevent Congress from criminalizing the possession of a firearm

95

Accord ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 31 (“In most such [federal
prosecutions], state interest in pursuing the offending conduct is not lacking.”).
96
United States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382, 393 (3d Cir. 2005).
97
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding that private use of personally
cultivated marijuana for medical purposes is part of economic class of activities that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce and thus subject to total congressional ban).
98
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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by a convicted felon or illegal alien, so long as the legislation contains an
express jurisdictional requirement that the gun or ammunition have passed
in interstate commerce.99 Likewise, Congress may proscribe virtually any
conduct that relates to drug trafficking.100 Similarly, the Commerce Clause
does not erect a barrier to the criminalization of simple arson, provided that
the building is not an owner-occupied residence.101 Certainly, some
policing is done at the margins by as-applied inquiries as to whether the
jurisdictional requirements are satisfied in the facts of a particular case. In
relation to some criminal statutes, courts have required satisfaction of a
jurisdictional element contained in the statute’s text,102 or have required a
factual showing of a nexus between the alleged violent crime and otherwise
proscribed behavior.103 Although a comprehensive analysis of the outer
99
See, e.g., United States v. Latu, 479 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining to extend
Lopez to prohibition on illegal alien possessing firearm); United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808
(4th Cir. 1996) (declining to extend holding of Lopez to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)); United States
v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Lee, 72 F.3d 55 (7th
Cir. 1995) (same).
100
See, e.g., Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 17-22; United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103, 110-11
(2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenges to various criminal provisions of
Controlled Substances Act because the Act “provide[s] a specific, reasonable finding by
Congress that local narcotics activity substantially affects interstate commerce,” and drug
trafficking is an inherently economic activity).
101
See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000). Jones interpreted 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i), which addresses the destruction by means of fire or explosive of any property used
in interstate commerce or in any activity affecting interstate commerce, narrowly so as not to
reach the behavior of Dewey Jones, who threw a Molotov cocktail into the home of his
cousin. Id. at 851. The government argued that the home was “used” in interstate commerce
in the respect that it secured a loan from an out-of-state lender, was the subject of an
insurance policy from an out-of-state insurer, and received natural gas from a source out of
state. Id. at 854-55. Justice Ginsburg observed that under the government’s reading, “hardly
a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute’s domain.” Id. at 857. Other
courts have not hesitated to apply 18. U.S.C. § 844(i) to instances in which the house was a
rental property. See, e.g., United States v. Logan, 419 F.3d 172, 181 (2d Cir. 2005); United
States v. Soy, 413 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2005).
102
See, e.g., United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 632 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that
jurisdictional hook is not “a talisman that wards off constitutional challenges” but rather
tends to “make a facial constitutional challenge unlikely or impossible, and to direct
litigation toward the statutory question of whether, in the particular case, the regulated
conduct possesses the requisite connection to interstate commerce”); United States v.
Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2003) (conducting Commerce Clause inquiry that goes
beyond whether jurisdictional requirement of statute superficially met); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000) (explaining that the presence of a “jurisdictional hook”
in a statute’s text that limits reach of statute to activities having an explicit connection with
or effect on interstate commerce helps establish the statute’s legitimacy under the Commerce
Clause).
103
See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 68 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Mich. 1999). In Garcia,
the court considered a defendant’s indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 1959, which prohibits
violent crimes in aid of racketeering (VCAR). In contrast to the Racketeer Influenced and
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limits of the Commerce Clause and the basis of authority for the federal
government to enact criminal laws is beyond the scope of this Article, the
vast majority of such legislation has been and will continue to be facially
valid under the Commerce Clause, barring a drastic change of interpretation
by the Supreme Court.104
B. DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE DOCTRINE OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY

A defendant searching for refuge from a federal capital prosecution
successive to state charges, such as Kenneth Barrett or Claude Dennis,
might look next to the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. The
clause enshrines a “fundamental idea in our constitutional heritage,”105
borne out of a persistent “fear and abhorrence of governmental power to try
people twice for the same conduct.”106 The underlying justification for the
prohibition on double jeopardy is that:
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006), which incorporates a
jurisdictional element by defining “enterprise” as one that is engaged in interstate commerce,
the VCAR contains no such requirement tying the violent act to interstate commerce. The
court in Garcia found that the de minimis impact on interstate commerce of the defendant’s
alleged activities—which were purely intrastate but did involve the use of federal interstate
highways—was sufficient to sustain a RICO indictment but not a charge under VCAR. Id.
104
Accord Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 12 (recognizing Controlled Substances Act (CSA) as “a
comprehensive regime to combat the international and interstate traffic in illicit drugs”).
Compare Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 70 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the justification of
legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause converts the clause into a pretext for
accomplishment of objects not entrusted to government, thereby stripping states of ability to
regulate local activities), with id. at 38-39 (Scalia, J., concurring) (denying that broad reading
of Necessary and Proper Clause will obliterate distinction between local and national spheres
because power can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an
interstate market). Federal crimes that touch upon narcotics trade in some manner, such as
21 U.S.C. § 848 (continuing criminal enterprise), are presumptively valid because in
enacting the CSA, “Congress made specific findings . . . that local narcotics activity
substantially affects interstate commerce.” United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103, 111 (2d
Cir. 1998). Similarly, criminal activity that involves the use of a firearm may be proscribed
by the federal government under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Weems,
322 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2003) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). But see United States v.
Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 634-36 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting inconsistency between firearms cases
and recent Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
105
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969); see also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S
121, 151-53 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (characterizing the prohibition on double jeopardy
as a “universal maxim of the common law”).
106
Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 151-53 (Black, J., dissenting).
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anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent
107
he may be found guilty.

However, the interpretation of this common law tenet is limited in its ability
to address concerns of defendants subject to successive state and federal
prosecutions for the same act. In the middle of the last century, the
Supreme Court articulated what is known as the “dual sovereignty doctrine”
when it ruled that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a state from
prosecuting and convicting a defendant who previously had been tried in
federal court.108 Conversely, no bar exists to a federal prosecution
following a state prosecution for the same conduct.109 These decisions
reiterated a formalistic application of double jeopardy and dual sovereignty:
the sovereignty of the states and the federal government derive from
different sources; a single act that violates the laws of each is actually two
crimes against two separate sovereigns; the Double Jeopardy Clause
prevents only multiple prosecutions by the same sovereign.110
The dual sovereignty doctrine conceives of the Double Jeopardy
Clause as a mechanism for policing within the bounds of federal and state
sovereignty, and ignores the interaction between the two. As a result, the
clause’s role in protecting the individual against oppressive governmental
power is lost when the federal and state governments act in concert. The
dissent in Bartkus observed that, when “looked at from the standpoint of the
individual,” the doctrine’s position “that a second trial for the same act is
somehow less offensive if one of the trials is conducted by the Federal
Government and the other by a State” is “too subtle . . . to grasp.”111
107

Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1959).
Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 121 (allowing state prosecution where defendant had been
acquitted in federal court).
109
Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (allowing federal prosecution where
defendants pleaded guilty in state court).
110
See id. at 193 (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)). In Moore
v. Illinois, the Court explained,
108

Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be said to owe
allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of
either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both. . . . That either or
both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly
averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act
he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable. He could not plead the
punishment by one in bar to a conviction in the other . . . .

55 U.S. 13, 20 (1852).
111
Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 155 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black feared that “[t]he
power to try a second time will be used, as have all similar procedures, to make scapegoats
of helpless, political, religious, or racial minorities and those who differ, who do not conform
and who resist tyranny.” Id. at 163. His dissent echoes that of Justice McLean, who earlier
argued that although the prohibition on multiple prosecutions applies to respective
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The continued viability of the dual sovereignty doctrine as articulated
in Bartkus and Abbate is open to question on multiple grounds.112 Bartkus
and Abbate were decided before incorporation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment.113 Thus, those decisions were
fundamentally concerned with avoiding any potential mischief that
asymmetrical application of the Double Jeopardy Clause could work in the
balance of power between the federal government and the states. Of
particular concern was the potential obstruction of federal law enforcement
priorities by lenient state prosecutions. As noted, “[I]f the States are free to
prosecute criminal acts violating their laws, and the resultant state
prosecutions bar federal prosecutions based on the same acts, federal law
must necessarily be hindered.”114 The concern with federal-state tension is
also reflected in the precedent marshaled in support of the dual sovereignty
doctrine. Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion in Bartkus cited a line of
cases culminating with Moore v. Illinois in which the Court held that states
could permissibly enforce statutes that were identical to the Fugitive Slave
Act, so long as the rule of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, protecting the rights of
slaveholders, was observed.115 The second major precedent cited by
governments, “its spirit applies with equal force against a double punishment, for the same
act, by a State and the federal government . . . . Nothing can be more repugnant or
contradictory than two punishments for the same act. It would be a mockery of justice and a
reproach to civilization.” In Justice McLean’s view, such a situation “would violate, not
only the common principles of humanity, but would be repugnant to the nature of both
governments.” Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 439-40 (1847) (McLean, J., dissenting). In a later
case employing the same view of dual sovereignty that would allow for multiple
prosecutions for the same offense by federal and state governments, Justice McLean noted
that the state and federal governments “operate on the same people,” and those people
“would not be satisfied with the logic or justice of the argument.” Moore, 55 U.S. at 22.
112
See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 641 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1981) (questioning doctrinal
underpinnings of decisions and their continued relevance in light of changed circumstances).
113
Justice Frankfurter noted in Bartkus that “we have held from the beginning and
uniformly that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the
States any of the provisions of the first eight amendments as such.” 359 U.S. at 124. In
Palko v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court declined to extend the Double Jeopardy Clause to
the states, and therefore confirmed that states were not prohibited from appealing a criminal
conviction. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). More than two decades later, the Court held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause does apply to the states. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,
794-96 (1969).
114
Abbate, 359 U.S. at 195; see also Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 156 (Black, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority opinion for “rel[ying] on the unwarranted assumption that State and
Nation will seek to subvert each other’s laws”); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 383
(1922) (“If a state were to punish the manufacture, transportation and sale of intoxicating
liquor by small or nominal fines, the race of offenders to the courts of that state to plead
guilty and secure immunity from federal prosecution for such acts would not make respect
for the federal statute or for its deterrent effect.”).
115
359 U.S. at 131-33.
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Frankfurter was United States v. Lanza, which involved enforcement of the
Eighteenth Amendment, the text of which explicitly committed its
enforcement to both the state and federal governments.116 Although the
potential for state obstruction of the enforcement of Prohibition was not as
high as with fugitive slave laws, it was still far from negligible, given the
express rejection of the Eighteenth Amendment in states like Rhode Island
and Connecticut. In this context, the prioritization of federal power over
potential individual rights issues is perhaps inevitable, but for precisely
these reasons, the decisions may not articulate the most balanced rule of
decision for resolution of contemporary cases.117
In addition to concerns about the use of precedent inscribed in a
particular historical moment, a significant change in circumstances calls
into question the current usefulness of the dual sovereignty doctrine.
Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause against the states has obviated
the need for a doctrine that protects against unilateral state obstructionism,
and expanded federal criminal jurisdiction has challenged a core
presumption of the doctrine that “the benignant spirit in which the
institutions both of the state and federal systems are administered” is
“almost certain” to prevent double punishment for “essentially the same”
acts, except “in instances of peculiar enormity, or where the public safety
demanded extraordinary rigor.”118 In fact, a “central feature” of current
federal law enforcement policy is cooperation with state and local
entities.119
When courts do recognize the threat posed to individual liberty by
concurrent state and federal criminal jurisdiction, the posited solution has
been that Congress could elect under the Supremacy Clause to make federal
criminal jurisdiction exclusive, or else could pass a law restricting federal
courts from entertaining successive state-federal prosecutions.120 Clearly,
116

U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2 (“The Congress and the several States shall have
concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”), repealed by U.S.
CONST. amend. XXI.
117
Accord Grimes, 641 F.2d at 103 (advising that “given such a politically freighted
issue,” the holding of those cases “should be read with considerable caution”).
118
Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 435 (1847).
119
See DOJ STATISTICAL SURVEY, supra note 13, at 4 (“[S]tate and federal law
enforcement officials often work cooperatively to maximize their overall ability to prevent
and prosecute violent criminal activity in their respective communities.”).
120
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 383 (1922) (“If Congress sees fit to bar
prosecution by the federal courts for any act when punishment for violation of state
prohibition has been imposed, it can, of course, do so by proper legislative provision, but it
has not done so.”). In limited instances, Congress has provided that a judgment of
conviction or acquittal on the merits in state court will bar federal prosecution of the same
conduct. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 660, 1991, 2101, 2117 (2006); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a36, 1282 (2006).
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Congress has not adopted this approach, and the dual sovereignty doctrine
now allows states and the federal government to act in conjunction (whether
willfully or not) to accomplish what neither could under the Constitution if
acting alone.121
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not undertaken a reexamination of
the doctrine, and today courts routinely dismiss the arguments of individual
defendants subject to multiple prosecutions with little more than a cursory
analysis and recitation of the doctrine that one act can be a crime against
two sovereigns, neither bound by the actions of the other.122 As discussed,
the dual sovereignty doctrine developed in part out of a concern with the
ability of states to undermine and obstruct federal law enforcement. Thus,
in the first instance, the doctrine requires a subordination of judicial concern
for the rights of individuals to the rights of competing political units within
our federal system. The inability of the dual sovereignty doctrine to address
the concerns of individuals has grown as the doctrine remains unyielding in
the face of mounting and routine federal-state cooperation in criminal
justice matters.
Federal-state cooperation has been particularly prolific in the area of
drug law enforcement.123 Even when federal and state authorities act
through one single task force to investigate criminal activity, courts do not
treat them as one prosecuting authority. Thus, defendants cannot invoke the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to carry over favorable rulings from a prior
prosecution into a second trial by a separate sovereign, even when both
sovereigns participated in the investigation of the case.124 A narrow
121

Accord Grimes, 641 F.2d at 101 (“Whenever a constitutional provision is equally
enforceable against the state and federal governments, it would appear inconsistent to allow
the parallel actions of state and federal officials to produce results which would be
constitutionally impermissible if accomplished by either jurisdiction alone.”).
122
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1990) (asserting that
“successive prosecutions for the same conduct remain rarities” and declining to apply state
court suppression ruling in federal court because federal government “cannot be fairly
considered to have had its day in court”); United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906,
909 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The Supreme Court has long held that an acceptable cost of federalism,
tolerable under principles of both double jeopardy and due process, is the risk of successive
prosecutions by state and federal authorities for identical conduct.”).
123
See Davis, 906 F.2d at 831 (“As the challenge facing the nation’s law enforcement
authorities has grown in sophistication and complexity, cooperation between federal and
local agencies has become increasingly important and increasingly commonplace. In
particular, joint federal-state operations have proved a crucial weapon in the long struggle
against those who deal in illegal drugs.”).
124
See id. at 829. In Davis, the defendant was investigated by the “Capital District Drug
Enforcement Task Force” in Albany, New York. The task force was comprised of state and
local officers who were “deputized as Special Deputy United States Marshals and operated
under the direct control and supervision of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.”
Id. at 831. The policy of the task force was to elect prosecution in “either state or federal
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exception exists where a second trial is so thoroughly controlled by the
sovereign who directed the first trial that it can be said to be a “sham and
cover” for a second prosecution by that sovereign,125 but the conditions for
applying this exception are rarely, if ever, found by a court.126
C. EQUAL PROTECTION

A defendant, such as Ronell Wilson or Donald Fell, selected for capital
prosecution federally where concurrent jurisdiction exists with a state that
does not have the death penalty might also hope to find some shelter in the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (rendered applicable
to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment).127 However,
courts have heard and rejected similar claims from defendants facing
dramatically higher sentences on narcotics charges as a result of federal,

court, whichever is most appropriate.” Id. Apparently the prosecution was “most
appropriate” initially in the court of Greene County, until that court suppressed key
evidence. Two weeks later, a federal indictment was returned in the Northern District of
New York. Id. The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling that the prosecution
should be bound by the Green County suppression ruling, finding that the federal
government “cannot be fairly considered to have had its day in court” because it was not a
party to the state case—no federal prosecutors were present during the suppression hearing,
and “[n]othing indicates that they provided assistance or advice to the local authorities at any
time, or were involved in any way with the local prosecution or the decision not to appeal the
suppression order.” Id. at 835. Other courts invoke a “laboring oar” theory and allow
nonmutual collateral estoppel when there was substantial and active participation by the
federal government in a prior state trial. See United States v. Parcel of Land at 5 Bell Rock
Road, 896 F.2d 605, 610 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Nasworthy, 710 F. Supp. 1353,
1355 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
125
Justice Brennan articulated this exception in his Bartkus dissent. He wrote that “the
record before us shows that the extent of participation of the federal authorities here
constituted this state prosecution actually a second federal prosecution.” Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121, 165-66 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Liddy, 542
F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (recognizing exception to the Bartkus rule to prevent federal
authorities from manipulating state processes to accomplish that which they cannot
constitutionally do themselves).
126
See, e.g., Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d at 901 (declining to “refine the somewhat
ambiguous contours” of the “sham and cover” exception but finding it inapplicable in the
context of joint investigation of criminal activity by state and federal authorities).
127
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Although by its terms the Amendment applies to the states, the
Supreme Court has read a concomitant restriction against the federal government into the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or
local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”);
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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rather than state, prosecutions.128 And although it seems inherently unfair
to select certain offenders for federal capital prosecution out of the vast
numbers of those eligible for such treatment, unfairness alone does not give
rise to an equal protection claim.129 It is not clear whether or how equal
protection’s demand that federal and state governments have, at a
minimum, a rational basis for treating similarly situated individuals
differently extends to the charging decisions of prosecutors.130 If a statute is
of general application and clearly satisfies the rational basis standard,
claims that a prosecutorial action violates equal protection are treated as
tantamount to claims of selective prosecution.131 Such claims place the
burden not on the government to explain its treatment of the defendant in
relation to others similarly situated, but on the defendant, who must
ultimately establish that the prosecutorial decision was motivated by
impermissible factors.132 The desire to attain harsher penalties is not an
impermissible factor,133 nor is the desire to circumvent state constitutional
128
See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 4 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting equal
protection and due process claims from defendant who urged that sole purpose of charging
case federally was to attain higher penalties); United States v. Oakes, 11 F.3d 897, 898-99
(9th Cir. 1993); see also Beale, supra note 15, at 997-99 (discussing disparities between
federal and state sentences).
129
But see Beale, supra note 15, at 996-1001; Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The
Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 668-73 (1997) (arguing that
disparate treatment violates equal protection in absence of rational basis for distinguishing
defendants tried in federal court versus state court).
130
See Clymer, supra note 129, at 684-86 (listing federal court decisions denying
implicitly and explicitly existence of rational basis requirement for prosecutorial decisions);
see also Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992) (ruling that federal
prosecutor’s decision not to file recommendation for downward departure in sentencing must
be rationally related to a legitimate government end).
131
See Clymer, supra note 129, at 684-86.
132
See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); see also United States v. Oakes, 11 F.3d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“[W]e have no jurisdiction to review prosecutors’ charging decisions, absent proof of
discrimination based on suspect characteristics such as race, religion, gender or personal
beliefs.”); United States v. Mills, 964 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v.
Carter, 953 F.2d 1449, 1461-62 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting equal protection claim based on
federal/state sentencing disparity); United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Allen, 954 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1992). To establish a selective prosecution
claim, defendants must demonstrate that they have been singled out for prosecution based
upon an “unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448, 456 (1962)); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
133
See, e.g., Oakes, 11 F.3d 897. In Oakes, the defendant’s federal prosecution resulted
in his imprisonment and forfeiture of his family home to the government. Id. at 898. As a
first-time offender, had he been prosecuted for the possession of one hundred marijuana
plants in state court, his sentence would have been between zero and ninety days. Id. “The
government admit[ted] that Oakes was prosecuted in federal court primarily because federal
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protections.134 Although a racial disparity has been demonstrated in the
application of the federal death penalty,135 this fact alone does not give rise
to an equal protection claim, absent a showing of intentional
discrimination.136
Intentional discrimination in a criminal justice litigation context is
notoriously difficult to prove.137 In order to gain discovery rights on a
selective prosecution claim, the defense must establish a “colorable basis”
for the conclusion that impermissible factors were in operation in the
decision to seek federal charges.138 Discovery, if attained, may not be
law provides for stiffer penalties and more rigorous forfeiture of the defendants’ property.”
Id. The court, although troubled by this disparity, found that “[u]nfortunately, the law gives
us no choice but to affirm.” Id.; see also United States v. Nance, 962 F.2d 860, 865 (9th Cir.
1992) (“[T]here are no grounds for finding a due process violation, even when the motive for
federal prosecution is that harsher sentences are possible.”).
134
See, e.g., United States v. Ucciferri, 960 F.2d 953 (11th Cir. 1992). The question
facing the court in Ucciferri was whether the district court properly dismissed a federal
indictment upon finding that the case had been investigated primarily by state authorities,
had no federal ties, and had been referred for federal prosecution solely for purposes of
taking advantage of less stringent federal standards concerning search warrants, wire
surveillance, and informants. Id. at 953. The district court found that the federal indictment
was “making a mockery of state constitutional protections.” Id. The Court of Appeals
reinstated the indictment, acknowledging that although “systematic transfer of what may
properly be called ‘state’ cases to federal court is a legitimate source of concern to federal
courts, precedent in this circuit suggests that an indictment may not be dismissed based upon
concerns of this kind.” Id. at 954.
135
Between 1995 and 2000, United States Attorneys recommended the death penalty
with respect to 494 defendants, 85 of whom were white and 242 of whom were black. See
DOJ STATISTICAL SURVEY, supra note 13, at 12. The Department of Justice disputes that a
racial disparity exists in the operation of the federal death penalty. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA, ANALYSIS AND
REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL CASE REVIEW (2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/
dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm (acknowledging that “[t]he proportion of minority
defendants in federal capital cases exceeds the proportion of minority individuals in the
general population,” but asserting that “[t]his is not the result of any form of bias,” but rather
a product of the fact that “organized drug trafficking is largely carried out by gangs whose
membership is drawn from minority groups”).
136
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 295 n.15 (1987) (finding a statistical
demonstration that African-American perpetrators of murder against white victims were
significantly more likely to be charged with a capital offense than other groups is not
sufficient to establish an equal protection violation because “decisions whether to prosecute
and what to charge necessarily are individualized and involve infinite factual variations”);
see also United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002) (per curiam) (rejecting claim that
statistics from Department of Justice reports supported claim of selective prosecution under
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 456).
137
See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297 (requiring “exceptionally clear proof before . . .
infer[ring] that the discretion has been abused”).
138
See, e.g., Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (ruling that defendant who seeks discovery on a
claim of selective prosecution must show some evidence both of discriminatory effect and
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particularly helpful, given that prosecutorial authorities, federal or state, are
not required to make the charging decision pursuant to any written
policy.139 Information relating to specific capital charging decisions of the
United States Attorney may not be disclosed outside of the Department of
Justice without prior approval of the Attorney General,140 and the
Department takes the position that “[t]he prosecution memoranda, death
penalty evaluation forms, non-decisional information forms and any other
internal memoranda informing the review process and the Attorney
General’s decision are not subject to discovery by the defendant or the
defendant’s attorney.”141 Courts have consistently held that the internal
policy of the Justice Department creates no substantive rights for those
prosecuted under circumstances within the purview of the Petite Policy.142
discriminatory intent). In Armstrong, the decision to charge defendants with federal rather
than California offenses meant that they faced a sentence of at least ten years and up to life
in prison. Under California law, the minimum sentence for that offense was three years, and
the maximum was five. See also United States v. Davis, 904 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La. 1995)
(rejecting selective prosecution claim that sought to shift burden to state to prove that death
penalty was not being used in a racially biased manner).
139
See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 4 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 1993). Jacobs argued that the
Fifth Amendment requires federal and state authorities to develop a formal procedure to be
used to determine which sovereign will charge a particular defendant. Id. at 604. The court
felt that “Jacobs’s arguments border[ed] on the frivolous.” Id. Because Jacobs did not
establish that the decision to prosecute him in federal court was based on impermissible
factors such as race, religion, or other arbitrary and unjustifiable classifications, his claim
failed. Id. (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)). One federal court found
that due process required the existence of a neutral policy by which a joint federal-state task
force would determine which cases to refer for federal prosecution, United States v.
Williams, 746 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Utah 1990), but this case was reversed on appeal, 963 F.2d
1337 (10th Cir. 1992), and its reasoning was thoroughly rejected in United States v.
Andersen, 940 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1991), where the court wrote: “[a]lthough a prosecutor
obviously cannot base charging decisions on a defendant’s race, sex, religion, or exercise of
a statutory or constitutional right, ‘so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe
that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file . . . generally rests entirely in his discretion.’” Id. at 596
(quoting Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364).
140
See USAM, supra note 29, § 9-10.040.
141
See id. § 9-10.080. The Department of Justice successfully shields these materials
from discovery under the deliberative process privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Frank, 8
F. Supp. 2d 253, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying discovery request and upholding
deliberative process privilege where “[d]iscovery of the deliberative materials would have a
chilling effect on the thorough evaluation of these issues and hinder the just, frank, and fair
review of the decision for every individual defendant who faces the prospect of receiving a
Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty”).
142
See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is
clear that the USAM [United States Attorney Manual] . . . ‘is not intended to, does not, and
may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by
any party in any manner civil or criminal.’” (quoting USAM, supra note 29, § 1.1-000)); see
also United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1990) (clarifying that Petite Policy
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Finally, the Attorney General’s decision to authorize a death penalty
prosecution is not reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act.143
Additionally, the formalistic rigidity of the dual sovereignty doctrine
limits the ability of defendants to get at the charging practices of both
relevant prosecuting authorities in instances of joint federal-state
cooperation. As noted above, the doctrine is oriented toward state-federal
obstruction. The formalism of first separating the actions of one sovereign
from another, and then persisting in strictly cabining them off as though
they have no bearing on one another, has the potential to obfuscate what
could otherwise be deemed discriminatory charging practices. When the
state and federal governments collude, an equal protection or due process
violation may have occurred in a jurisdiction other than the one in which
the prosecution takes place. Just as the courts have been loath to find that
the state and federal government ought to be bound by the other’s actions
for purposes of double jeopardy or collateral estoppel, courts may not hold
one sovereign accountable for discriminatory charging practices of another
jurisdiction—including the practice of referring certain defendants for
federal prosecution—even though the presence of the second prosecution
may very well be the product of that discrimination or arbitrariness.
D. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

As learned by Claude Dennis, the decision to charge a federal crime
can result in the summoning of a dramatically different jury pool than had
the crime been charged in a state court. For example, a defendant charged
for a crime in Suffolk County, the jurisdiction of which encompasses
Boston, Massachusetts, would draw a jury from a voting-age population
that is 20% African-American.144 However, if charged by the United States
Attorney in the Eastern Division of the District of Massachusetts, the jury
would be drawn from a voting-age population that is 7% African“is not a limitation on the government’s sovereign right to vindicate its interests and
values”); United States v. Booth, 673 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1982) (“The [Petite Policy] does
not create a corresponding right in the accused.”); United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531,
536-37 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The Petite policy is not law, but rather an executive policy that
permits exceptions in the Attorney General’s discretion.”); United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d
1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting the claim that the “internal housekeeping rule” of the
Department of Justice entitled criminal defendant to judicial relief).
143
See Walker v. Reno, 925 F. Supp. 124 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (ruling that actions
undertaken by the Attorney General within the exercise of his or her prosecutorial discretion
are committed to agency discretion and should be presumed immune from judicial review
under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). The Walker court rejected the argument that the protocols set
forth in USAM § 9-10.000 provided standards by which courts might review individual
charging decisions. Id. at 128-29.
144
See United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 37 (D. Mass. 2005).
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American.145 In practice, moreover, after accounting for the rate of return
on jury summonses in the Eastern Division, the percentage of the pool that
is African-American drops to 3%.146 The vast majority of juries drawn in
the Eastern Division, in fact, do not have a single African-American
member.147 Similar disparities exist in many other areas, where the jury
pool in federal court will have a dramatically lower incidence of minority
representation and participation.148
As dramatic as these numbers may be, they do not necessarily amount
to a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to criminal defendants of
a jury that represents a fair cross-section of the community.149 In order to
prove a Sixth Amendment fair cross-section claim,
a defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive”
group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such
persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic
150
exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.

Although this analysis, like the double jeopardy rubric, has been criticized
as being overly formalistic in general,151 it is particularly problematic in
relation to the differences in composition between juries in the federal and
state systems. A change in forum brings a change in “community,” and the
second prong of the Sixth Amendment inquiry does not interrogate the
choice of forum or the boundaries of “community” as drawn by the forum.
Although the third prong calls for a showing that the system itself is
responsible for producing the disparity (rather than failure on the part of the
145

Id.
See id. at 47-49.
147
Id. at 39.
148
See Laura G. Dooley, The Dilution Effect: Federalization, Fair Cross-Sections, and
the Concept of Community, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 79, 89-90 (2004) (comparing the 42%
African-American population in Wayne County, which contains Detroit, with the 21%
African-American population of the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division).
149
The purposes of the fair cross-section requirement are threefold: (1) “to guard against
the exercise of arbitrary power” and invoke “the commonsense judgment of the community
as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor”; (2) to preserve “public
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system”; and (3) to share “the
administration of justice” as “a phase of civic responsibility.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 530-31 (1975).
150
Duren v. Mississippi, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
151
See, e.g., Peter A. Detre, A Proposal for Measuring Underrepresentation in the
Composition of The Jury Wheel, 103 YALE L.J. 1913, 1921 (1994) (noting criticism of the
“absolute disparity” metric to assess levels of underrepresentation); see also Green, 389 F.
Supp. 2d at 50 (criticizing the fair cross-section cases for measuring underrepresentation
using “something of a contrivance, a normative determination of how much disparity is too
much,” and stating that “there should not be a magic number”).
146

180

EILEEN M. CONNOR

[Vol. 100

distinctive group to respond to jury summonses, for example), the very
decision which accounts for a significant portion of the disparity—the
decision of the United States Attorney to charge the case federally—is not
part of the analysis.152 Of course, a defendant might attempt to establish a
claim under equal protection that the choice of forum was motivated in part
by the desire of the United States Attorney to obtain a racially stilted
jury,153 but this claim requires proof of intentional discrimination, whereas a
prima facie case under the Sixth Amendment may be established by proof
that a particular method of jury selection has a disparate impact on
distinctive groups within the community.154 As discussed, in order to
succeed, a defendant would need to show that the United States Attorney
violated his or her equal protection rights by engaging in intentional
discrimination or relied intentionally on impermissible factors—in this
instance, that the decision to charge the crime federally was motivated in
part by a desire to obtain an all-white jury.155
* * *
The constitutional doctrines discussed above did not develop in
anticipation of the contemporary landscape of federal criminal jurisdiction
152

In United States v. Green, the district court confronted the question of whether the
jury drawn for the capital trial of the defendants in the Eastern Division of the District of
Massachusetts violated the Sixth Amendment. 389 F. Supp. 2d at 29. The court, citing the
statistics concerning the size of African-American populations in the relevant state and
federal jury pools as well as the rate of return on jury summonses in federal court, found
nonetheless that a Sixth Amendment challenge could not be sustained. Id. at 38. In so ruling
the district court judge noted that because “defendants 1) cannot prove the magnitude of the
disparity that the First Circuit has thus far required, although they have proved substantial
disparity, and 2) cannot prove the precise extent to which that disparity is attributable to
flaws in the system itself, although they have proved that official action and inaction
contributes to the problem, I am obliged to deny their constitutional challenges.” Id. The
court went on to read the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869, to set the
bar higher than the Sixth Amendment in imposing an affirmative obligation on districts to
use a jury selection process that ensures a fair cross-section of the community. Green, 389
F. Supp. 2d at 63-75. The First Circuit reversed. See In re United States, 426 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2005).
153
Cf. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 42 n.20 (“Defendants have not argued that the
government chose a federal forum precisely to affect the racial composition of the jury, an
argument that may well raise Equal Protection concerns.”).
154
Compare Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208-09 (1965) (finding that a 10%
disparity in representation of a minority group in a jury is insufficient to prove intentional
discrimination required for equal protection claim), with Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
526-33 (1975) (finding a Sixth Amendment violation based on systemic underrepresentation
of women in jury pool without requiring showing of intentional discrimination).
155
Cf. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 42 n.20 (“Defendants have not argued that the
government chose a federal forum precisely to affect the racial composition of the jury, an
argument that may well raise Equal Protection concerns.”).
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and increasing federal and state cooperation in law enforcement and
criminal prosecution. As a consequence, each government can accomplish,
acting in tandem, what it could not when acting alone. These conditions
allow for the subversion or avoidance of constitutional limitations on
governmental power and their corresponding safeguards for individuals.
These constitutional doctrines do not grapple with and address the realities
of concurrent criminal jurisdiction within our dual government.
In sum, criminal defendants experience an on-the-ground reality that is
starkly different than the operative backdrop against which these doctrines
developed. That dual sovereignty results in multiple prosecutions,
escalating sentences, and a subversion of individual rights that cuts against
a fundamental and founding precept of federalism—that by vesting the
power conferred by the people in two spheres of government, state and
federal, “a double security arises to the rights of the people.”156
IV. CAPITAL POLICYMAKING AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES
This section examines the institutional capacity of the federal
government as a criminal justice policymaker. Part IV.A identifies
structural features that distinguish the federal government from the states
and that have bearing on how the former enacts criminal justice legislation.
These factors include the size and heterogeneity of the territory within the
federal government’s jurisdiction, the limited nature of the federal
government’s police power, and a decreased sensitivity to the cost of
criminal justice legislation. These factors dictate that Congress as a
criminal justice policymaker is less able than states to aggregate preferences
in writing criminal laws and sustaining a dynamic connection between
public values and criminal justice policy.
These institutional features and limitations have particular relevance to
the ability of the federal government to formulate a coherent and
constitutional death penalty scheme. The death penalty is not like other
sentences, and the Eighth Amendment requires that the legislature put forth
a rational statutory scheme that ensures that the death penalty will only be
available for a subset of murderers—the worst of the worst.157 Furthermore,
156

THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Though on the surface the idea may seem
counterintuitive, it was the insight of the Framers that freedom was enhanced by the creation
of two governments, not one.”); THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton).
157
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343 (U.S. June 25, 2008) (“Confirmed by
repeated, consistent rulings of this Court . . . [the] use of the death penalty [must] be
restrained. The rule of evolving standards of decency with specific marks on the way to full
progress and mature judgment means that the resort to the [death] penalty must be reserved
for the worst of crimes and limited in its instances of application.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
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the “evolving standards of decency” to which the Eighth Amendment is
keyed suggest that legislatures engage in a dynamic and ongoing calibration
of their death penalty regime. For the reasons discussed below in Part
IV.C, the states are institutionally better suited to maintaining a sustained
dialogue regarding criminal justice policy, as recent history bears out.
Given the overlap of federal and state criminal laws, it may be
tempting to view federal and state governments as similar or even fungible
actors. However, this would be a mistake. The federal government and the
respective states have very different attributes and responsibilities with
respect to criminal justice. Each political unit has the ability to make
certain policy choices regarding criminal justice, from legislating against
certain conduct to allocating resources for law enforcement and
punishment. Likewise, each political unit has the ability to subscribe to a
certain rationale for punishment and to determine the overall degree of
punitiveness with which it metes out criminal sanctions. At issue in this
section is not that the states and the federal government might strike this
balance differently, particularly with respect to capital punishment, but
rather the process by which that balance is reached. This Part argues that
the states are significantly better suited to reach policy decisions that are
genuinely reflective of the body politic’s preferences regarding whether the
death penalty should be available in any case and, when it is to be available,
which class of murderers represents the “worst of the worst.”
A. SPECIFIC CHALLENGES DUE TO SIZE AND HETEROGENEITY
OF THE JURISDICTION

The first structural feature that distinguishes the federal government
from the states as a criminal justice actor is perhaps the most obvious—the
federal government must write laws that are generally applicable across the
entirety of the vastly varied nation. The experiences of states and the
federal government in formulating and implementing determinate
sentencing systems over the last several decades provide a useful
illustration of the special challenges that arise given the size and
heterogeneity of the territory over which the federal government legislates.
Many jurisdictions, including the federal government, have
implemented determinate sentencing schemes or guidelines in order to

U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (reasoning that in extreme cases, where a crime is “so grievous an
affront to humanity[,] the only adequate response may be the penalty of death”); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 294 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[I]t is highly implausible that
only the worst criminals or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for this
punishment.”).
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achieve uniformity and rationality in sentencing.158 Guidelines systems,
which are now only constitutional if strictly advisory,159 rely on a rank
ordering of offenses and a system for evaluating the characteristics of the
offender. When combined, these two considerations form a matrix that
assigns incrementally harsher punishments for incrementally “worse”
offenses.
Just as capital policymaking requires a judgment about which types of
offenses qualify as among the worst and thus ought to be eligible to be
punished by death, jurisdictions enacting guideline systems need to address
the relative seriousness of the range of criminal offenses. One of the first
tasks facing the United States Sentencing Commission was to rank order the
list of crimes in the United States Code according to the relative harm they
caused and therefore the relative harshness in sentence length each crime
ought to carry. This was particularly challenging for the federal
government.
Whereas states, with their smaller size and relative
homogeneity of population, might, through shared political traditions or
common experience, reach a consensus on such an issue, no such
homogeneity of preference can be discerned within the nation as a whole.160
For the United States Sentencing Commission, the attempt to rank
order crimes resulted in an overall increase in punishments. Justice Breyer
explained the unfolding of a process that led not to a coherent rationale or
theory of punishment, but to an overall ratcheting up of punishment across
the board. As he described, the Commission
may first accept the singular view of Commissioner A, who believes that
environmental crimes are particularly serious; later, the group would strongly address
the criminal conduct which Commissioner B finds repugnant; then the Commission
would turn the floor over to Commissioner C, who feels strongly about some other set
161
of crimes.”

158

See generally Douglas A. Berman & Steven L. Chanenson, The Real (Sentencing)
World: State Sentencing in the Post-Blakeley Era, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27 (2006); Richard
S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190 (2005).
159
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296 (2004).
160
Before he sat on the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer observed that “Minnesotans may
agree, for example, that building new prisons is undesirable or impractical; they may be
willing to tailor prison sentences to create a total prison population of roughly consonant
size. There is no such consensus, however, throughout the nation as a whole.” See Stephen
G. Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1988). To illustrate his point, Justice Breyer cites
conflicting testimony before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, of Margaret Giari,
arguing against the construction of additional prisons, and of Congressman George W.
Gekas, arguing in favor of building bigger and better jails. Id. at 4 n.18.
161
See id. at 15.
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The Commission abandoned any attempt to rationally order criminal
offenses according to their respective “badness,” instead basing their grid
on average past practice, culled from an analysis of ten thousand actual
cases.162
Two points about this are relevant. First is the difficulty faced by a
national body in aggregating or ascertaining preferences in relation to
criminal justice policy across the entire nation. This difficulty renders the
federal government at a disadvantage, compared to the states, in rationally
and coherently selecting the category of crimes that are subject to capital
punishment. Even if Congress had the capacity to assess accurately
national sentiment in relation to the death penalty, the existence of such a
sentiment is belied by the current patchwork landscape of capital
punishment. As has recently been observed, “the United States is not
monolithic in its death penalty practices.”163 At the state level, it is not a
simple question of whether the state has the death penalty or does not. In
reality there are three categories: states without the death penalty, states
with the death penalty but insignificant numbers of executions, and states
with both the death penalty in law and in practice.164
Furthermore, it may be too simplistic to assume that an opinion on the
death penalty, as reflected by state legislation and local practice, translates
perfectly in the aggregate to nationwide support for, or rejection of, the
federal death penalty. An individual might have differing criminal justice
preferences in relation to his state versus the federal government.
Distinctions surely exist, in the public’s view, between the appropriateness
of the death penalty for crimes that fall within the core of federal concern—
crimes that target the United States qua the United States or concern
territories or borders; crimes of international terrorism; or crimes that are
beyond the capacity of any one state to prosecute—and the appropriateness
of the death penalty in relation to all instances in which it is legally
available under federal law. So while nationwide support might exist for a
national death penalty to be used against those who commit, for example,
terrorist acts aimed at undermining the federal government, it is not
necessarily true that the public supports the federal death penalty for
garden-variety murder.
Second, the Sentencing Commission demonstrated the tendency, in the
absence of discernable preferences, to elevate punitiveness across the board.
This is out of step with the general trend of constitutional jurisprudence
162

See id. at 8; see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2009).
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations: Implementation of the
Death Penalty in “Executing” Versus “Symbolic” States in the United States, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 1869, 1870 (2006).
164
Id.
163
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surrounding the death penalty, which calls for increasingly finer distinctions
and narrowing determinations to be made with respect to that punishment.
Although one cannot analogize from the experience of the Sentencing
Commission to the practice of Congress in writing criminal laws and setting
punishment in general, there are other structural features, discussed below,
which render Congress at a higher risk for writing hortatory and harsh
criminal laws than the states.
B. EFFECT OF THE LACK OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENERAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT ON CONGRESS AS A CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ACTOR

Another structural feature with important implications for the way in
which the federal government functions as a criminal justice actor is the
limited nature of its police power. Given that the vast majority of crimes
are punished by state authorities,165 it is more likely that citizens hold their
local and state-level representatives responsible for maintaining general law
and order, and are cognizant of or reliant on federal law enforcement only
in cases that fall in the interstices of state power,166 or for crimes in which
the United States qua the United States is a victim.167
The fact that the states remain the primary enforcers of criminal law
stands to have a distorting effect on the federal government as a criminal
justice actor. In cases where the federal government does not risk suffering
in the eyes of the people for failing to maintain general law and order,
members of Congress nonetheless may gain by enacting criminal legislation
that is responsive to a particularly outrageous or high-profile type of
criminal behavior. Criminal legislation allows politicians to appear “tough
on crime” without internalizing any of the costs of administering the law—
appropriation does not necessarily accompany criminalization—and in the
end, the general populace still relies on local and state governments for day-

165

See supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining incidences of federal murder
prosecutions); see also ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 18 (“Due to limited
resources—investigative personnel, federal prosecutors, and court facilities—federal
criminal law can realistically respond to only a relatively small number of local crimes at
any given time.”).
166
See, e.g., INTERSTATE COMM’N ON CRIME, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME 114
(1938) (praising the National Bank Robbery Statute for rendering “flight” from prosecution
more difficult).
167
See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts,
543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 40 (1996) (noting that early federal offenses,
including treason, bribery of federal officials, perjury in federal court, and theft of
government property “dealt with injury to or interference with the federal government itself
or its programs”).
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to-day law enforcement.168 Thus, “the impetus for [a federal criminal law]
derives from public discomfort about the offense at a time of intense
publicity.”169 This reactionary tendency of federal criminal law has been
evident from the passage of the Lindbergh Law170 through the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act171 and beyond. In practice, Congress
“typically enacts broad criminal statutes that satisfy the public’s desire to
‘do something’ about crime yet avoid the hard political choices that more
specificity implicates.”172 The hard political choices often come with face-

168
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1276, 1294 (2005) (“[S]entencing legislation is often passed as a symbolic gesture of
concern for a particular high profile incident . . ..”); Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 897-98 (2000) (arguing Congress deserves blame for overfederalization of criminal law because interest group support for new criminal legislation
often makes federalization irresistible to federal lawmakers). Professor Barkow also speaks
of the “availability heuristic,” by which people estimate how frequently an event occurs
based on how easy it is to recall the event, and the impact of this cognitive phenomenon on
the public demand for criminal justice legislation that is responsive to sensational or
newsworthy crime. Barkow, supra, at 1284-94.
169
Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled Basis for Federal
Criminal Legislation, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 15, 20 (1996). Zimring and
Hawkins identify the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006), as an example of
such a proposal because “[t]he behavior that constitutes carjacking is punishable in all fifty
states, and increasingly, states are defining carjacking as a separate substantive offense.” Id.;
see also ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 14-15 (“New crimes are often enacted
in patchwork response to newsworthy events, rather than as part of a cohesive code
developed in response to an identifiable federal need.”).
170
Congress adopted the federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006), in
response to the kidnapping of the infant son of Charles Lindbergh and the public’s “seriou[s]
concer[n] about the mounting incidence of professional kidnapping and the apparent
inability of state and local authorities to cope with the interstate aspects of the problem.”
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 589 n.34 (1968); see also Colin V. Ram, Note,
Regulating Intrastate Crime: How the Federal Kidnapping Act Blurs the Distinction
Between What Is Truly National and What Is Truly Local, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767
(2008).
171
See President’s Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719, 721 (Apr. 24, 1996) (remarking on
legislation created in response to the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City);
Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 699, 701 (2002).
172
Simons, supra note 168, at 929. Simons elaborates, “Even if it were possible to draft
a statute detailed and specific enough to cover only the precise conduct warranting
federalization, the opportunity costs involved in such an effort and the difficulty in reaching
agreement on the exact goals of the legislation remain formidable barriers . . . . [T]he more
detailed a criminal statute is, the more difficult it will be to obtain a legislative consensus on
the policy underlying the statute . . . . The end result is that Congress paints with a broad
brush, establishing only the minimum criteria for a crime.” Id. at 929-30.
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to-face accountability and with the considerations of cost against a
backdrop of scarcity.
Because the federal government is not responsible for administering a
general and comprehensive criminal justice regime, it may be freer in its
criminal law enactments. For example, the federal death penalty may be
available in instances where the theory of liability is felony-murder, rather
than intentional murder.173 In general, allowing the death penalty to apply
beyond intentional murder will mean a significant increase in the number of
potential capital prosecutions in a jurisdiction. Whereas a state might factor
in the cost of bringing unintentional murders within the ambit of its death
penalty statute, Congress does not similarly consider that the overall
number of capital prosecutions will increase significantly based on its
actions, because the overall pool of federal criminal justice resources
remains the same.174 The intent of Congress in enacting legislation that, for
example, makes the death penalty available for kidnapping felony murder175
or bank robbery felony murder176 was not necessarily to alter dramatically
the number of federal death penalty prosecutions by pressing the reach of
the regime beyond intentional murders. A second consequence of the
limited police power possessed by the federal government is that Congress
often must legislate against crime in an indirect manner.177 For example,
the United States may not directly prohibit first-degree murder simplicitur,
except in those places subject to its maritime or territorial jurisdiction.
Thus, within 18 U.S.C. § 1111, which describes the crimes of first and
second degree murder, is a punishment provision that references other
crimes that Congress may directly proscribe under its commerce power.178
This circuitous relationship to the crimes at issue may make more difficult a
frank political dialogue about the relative harms caused by different
criminal behavior, as well as the situations in which capital punishment
might be appropriate. The link between the crime, the power of the
government to punish, and the duty of the government to protect the
citizenry against the criminal conduct is substantially more direct and
transparent at the state level than it is at the federal level.
173

The federal death penalty statute codifies the intent required by Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), for non-triggermen at 21
U.S.C. § 848(n)(1)(A)-(D) (2006).
174
See supra Part IV.A.
175
18 U.S.C. § 1201.
176
Id. § 2113(e).
177
See supra Part IV.A.
178
Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 596-97 n.6 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citing early federal criminal statutes and cases for proposition that Congress has “no general
right to punish murder committed within any of the States” (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 426 (1821))).
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Finally, as a result of the limited nature of its police power, the federal
government has fewer theories under which it may rationally enact penal
legislation than do the states. The infrequency with which the federal death
penalty is applied weakens its capacity to serve as a deterrent.179
Furthermore, the full extent of federal criminal law—and the
correspondingly broad applicability of the federal death penalty—is not
well understood by the general public. That federal prosecutions are
initiated in only a small percentage of instances in which a federal law has
been broken180 only serves to reinforce the public impression that federal
police power is limited rather than comprehensive, and targeted only at
offenses that are exceptional in their national importance. However, the
reality, as noted by numerous legal scholars, the federal courts, and other
observers, is that federal criminal law reaches behavior that is well outside a
core of obvious federal concern.181 These reasons caution, therefore, that
under the “rational actor” theory of deterrence, the ability of federal law to
create either specific or general deterrence is weak.
While deterrence is not the only theory under which legislatures may
rationally enact criminal laws, it has played a special role in upholding the
validity of the death penalty against Eighth Amendment challenges. When
the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia, a key
finding was that the punishment could not be said to be cruel and unusual
given that legislatures might legitimately conclude that the punishment had
some social utility as a deterrent of crime.182 The Court deferred to “the
legislatures” on the “complex factual issue” of whether the death penalty
deters crime, trusting them to “evaluate the results of statistical studies in
terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is
not available to the courts.”183 It seems clear from the context of this quote
that the Court had in mind state legislatures. For the reasons discussed
above, deterrence does not seem to have particular relevance to the validity
179

This limitation applies to federal criminal law in general. See ABA TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 15, at 22 (”[R]are use of many federalization statutes calls into question
the belief that federalization can have a meaningful impact on street safety and local crime”).
180
See, e.g., DOJ STATISTICAL SURVEY, supra note 13, at 4.
181
See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1127, 1128-31 (1997) (recognizing that federal jurisdiction, concerning
the power of the federal government to enact criminal law, is broader than federal interest to
be vindicated by such legislation).
182
428 U.S. 153, 185-86 (1975).
183
Id.; see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 478-49 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“A majority of the Court has concluded that the general
deterrence rationale adequately justifies the imposition of capital punishment . . . . However,
in reaching this conclusion we have stated that this is a judgment peculiarly within the
competence of legislatures.”).
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of the federal death penalty, even if the national legislature were capable of
using a flexible approach to study local conditions.
C. EFFECT OF LACK OF COST-SENSITIVITY ON THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT AS A CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACTOR

In addition to those mentioned above, another institutional feature that
distinguishes the federal government from the state as a criminal justice
actor is that Congress is less sensitive to cost. As a general matter, states,
unlike the federal government, cannot print money or otherwise manipulate
currency. Furthermore, most state governments are required by statute or
by constitution to balance the budget, and deficit spending is likewise
generally not an option for states.184 It is also the case that the cost of
corrections comprises a significant portion of state budgets—6% of the
general funds of all states in the aggregate.185
Here again the experiences of the states and the federal government
with sentencing guideline systems provide useful examples of the
respective cost-sensitivity of these actors. The guideline systems of states
generally possess one critical attribute lacking in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: state sentencing bodies are often explicitly required to consider
cost and correctional resources when establishing their guidelines.186 For
example, Kansas was one of the first states to adopt a guidelines system.
Senate Bill 50, adopted in 1989, created the Kansas Sentencing
Commission (Commission), and charged it with “[d]evelop[ing] a
sentencing guideline model or grid based on fairness and equity and . . .
provid[ing] a mechanism for linking justice and corrections policies.”187 In
developing this model, the Commission was directed by the legislature to
“take into substantial consideration current sentencing and release practices
and correctional resources, including but not limited to the capacities of
local and state correctional facilities.”188 Any recommendations by the
Commission must include a report on the impact of the proposed guidelines
on the state’s prison population, corrections programs, and a study of ways
to “more effectively utilize correction dollars and to reduce prison
184

See Barkow, supra note 168, at 1290.
See id.
186
See id. at 1288 (“Most state sentencing commissions are required to produce resource
impact statements or fiscal notes that alert the legislature to how a particular sentencing
proposal will affect corrections resources.”). Virginia’s sentencing commission must
provide economic impact statements for any proposed sentencing legislation, and the
legislation cannot go to the floor until the bill’s sponsor secures revenue for the initiative.
Id.
187
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9101(b)(1) (2008).
188
Id.
185
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population.”189 The Commission is further charged with providing the
legislature with inmate population figures annually, and when the projected
population exceeds capacity, the Commission must propose specific options
for reducing the number of prison admissions or adjusting sentence lengths
for certain groups of offenders.190
In contrast, the Sentencing Reform Act, which created the United
States Sentencing Commission, did not set any fiscal impact imperatives.
Although, according to now-Justice Stephen Breyer, an original member of
the Commission, a “prison-impact study” was commissioned,191 its results
were wildly incorrect. Using twenty different assumptions, the study
predicted that the federal prison population under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines would differ from what it would be in the absence of the
Guidelines by anywhere from negative 2% to positive 10%.192 Data
indicate that between 1995 and 2003—years in which the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines were in effect—the federal prison population
increased by 81%.193 Although there are indications that the increase in
prison population is attributable largely to the harshness of drug sentences
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—between 1992 and 2002, the
average sentence for a drug offense increased by 31%, and in 2003 a full
third (34.4%) of the federal prison population was comprised of first time,
nonviolent offenders194—the important point for this analysis is that the
federal sentencing system, unlike most of those in the states, contained no
requirement that sentencing policy choices be accountable or in any way
dynamic in relation to correctional resources.
Because an institution is bound by cost does not in and of itself mean
that a jurisdiction will reach better criminal justice policies and outcomes.
It does mean, however, that the debate regarding those policies will be more
sustained and ongoing and thus more likely to reflect reasoned
189

Id. § 74-9101(b)(6).
Id. § 74-9101(b)(15).
191
See Breyer, supra note 160, at 24.
192
Id.
193
THE SENT’G PROJECT, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 12
(2004),
available
at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
inc_federalprisonpop.pdf (relying on BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SURVEY OF INMATES IN STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (1997); BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2003 (2004); BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2002
(2004); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1994 (1998); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING (2004); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS (2003); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY
(2002)).
194
Id. at 1.
190
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contemporary values. This is precisely the type of ongoing calibration of
“evolving standards of decency” from which the Eighth Amendment draws
its meaning.195
There is ample evidence that states, unlike the federal government, are
currently engaged in searching reviews of various aspects of their death
penalty systems. Concurring in the Supreme Court’s recent consideration
of the constitutionality of lethal injection protocols, Justice Stevens
suggested that “[t]he time for a dispassionate, impartial comparison of the
enormous costs that death penalty litigation imposes on society with the
benefits that it produces has certainly arrived.”196 His suggestion was as
much descriptive as prescriptive. Among states with the death penalty,197 a
significant number have undertaken a process to reevaluate the merits of
continuing the practice. In the past several years, the legislatures of
Arizona,198 California,199 Connecticut,200 Illinois,201 Indiana,202 Kansas,203
195

See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1548-49 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
197
Currently, thirty-five states authorize the death penalty by statute. The District of
Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin do not.
See DEBORAH FINS, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH ROW
U.S.A. 1 (2008), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/
DRUSA_Winter_2008.pdf.
198
Arizona Attorney General Janet Napolitano formed the Attorney General’s Capital
Case Commission in 2000 to “study key issues and make recommendations to try to ensure
that the death penalty process in Arizona is just, timely, and fair to defendants and victims.”
See OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF ARIZ., CAPITAL CASE COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 1
(2002), available at http://www.azag.gov/CCC/FinalReport.html. The study was not
commissioned by the legislature, but members of the commission included members of the
Arizona legislature, as well as prosecutors, defense attorneys, trial and appellate judges,
victims’ rights advocates, and citizens. Id.
199
California Senate Resolution 44 created the California Commission on the Fair
Administration of Justice and charged it with studying a variety of criminal justice issues,
including the death penalty system. S.R. 44, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). The final
report of the Commission with respect to the death penalty concluded that the system was
dysfunctional and required immediate legislative attention in several key areas. See CAL.
COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE FAIR
ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA 3-4 (2008) (hereinafter CALIFORNIA
REPORT), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/rr-dp-official.html.
200
In 2001, the General Assembly of Connecticut created a commission to study
fourteen specific aspects of the death penalty in that state, including the existence of
disparities in its application based on race, ethnicity, or jurisdiction, and its cost. See STATE
OF CONN. COMM’N ON THE DEATH PENALTY, STUDY PURSUANT TO PUBLIC ACT NO. 01-151 OF
THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CONNECTICUT 1-2 (2003), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/olr/Death%20Penalty%20Commission%20Final%20Report.pdf.
201
In 2000, an executive order of the Governor of Illinois created the Commission on
Capital Punishment, and charged it with studying several aspects of the death penalty with
special attention to the need for greater procedural safeguards. See REPORT OF THE
196
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Maryland,204 Nevada,205 New Jersey,206 New York,207 North Carolina,208
Tennessee,209 and Virginia210 have ordered commissions to study aspects of
GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/complete_report.pdf.
The
Governor’s Commission succeeded the House Death Penalty Task Force, which declined to
issue a formal report. Id. at 1.
202
In 2002, at the request of the Governor and the General Assembly, the Indiana
Criminal Justice Institute studied the costs and racial dynamics, among other things, of the
death penalty in Indiana. IND.A CRIM. JUST. INST., THE APPLICATION OF INDIANA’S CAPITAL
SENTENCING LAW: FINDINGS OF THE INDIANA CRIMINAL LAW STUDY COMMISSION (2002),
available at http://www.in.gov/cji/files/law_book.pdf.
203
Under the Kansas Governmental Operations Accountability Law, two Kansas state
senators requested in 2003 that a special audit commission study the costs of capital
punishment to state and local units of government. See STATE OF KAN. LEG. DIV. OF POST
AUDIT, PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT: COSTS INCURRED FOR DEATH PENALTY CASES: A KGOAL AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 1 (2003), available at
http://www.kslegislature.org/postaudit/audits_perform/04pa03a.pdf. The report estimated
the costs of a death penalty case to be 70% more than the cost of a comparable non-death
case. Id. at 11. In 2004, the Kansas Judicial Council studied specific aspects of the death
penalty, including the existence of geographical and racial disparities in the penalty’s
application, the existence of legal protections for the wrongly convicted, and the existence of
a general deterrent effect under the death penalty. See Report of the Kansas Judicial Council
Death Penalty Advisory Committee on Certain Issues Related to the Death Penalty 6 (2004),
available at http://www.kscourts.org/pdf/studies/death_penalty_rpt11-12-04.pdf.
204
On May 13, 2008, Governor Martin O’Malley signed into law Senate Bill 614,
thereby creating the Maryland Commission on Capital Punishment. S. 614, 2008 Leg., Reg.
Sess.
(Md.
2008),
available
at
http://mlis.state.md.us/2008rs/chapters_noln/
Ch_430_sb0614E.pdf. The Commission is charged with studying “all aspects of capital
punishment as currently and historically administered” and with making “recommendations
concerning the application and administration of capital punishment in the state so that they
are free from bias and error and achieve fairness and accuracy.” Id.
205
Created in 2007, Nevada’s Advisory Commission on the Administration of Justice,
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.0123 (West Supp. 2009), undertook a study of the cost of
administering the death penalty in the state. See Cy Ryan, Death Penalty a Costly
Proposition, L.V. SUN, July 9, 2008, at 3.
206
The New Jersey legislature created a commission to assess the merits of the death
penalty and determine whether its continued use was justified. Act of Jan. 12, 2006, ch. 321,
2005 N.J. Laws 2165. The commission issued its final report in January 2007. See N.J.
DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION REPORT
(2007) (hereinafter NEW JERSEY REPORT), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/
committees/dpsc_final.pdf. The legislature adopted the Commission’s recommendation, and
abolished the death penalty on December 17, 2007. Act of Dec. 17, 2007, ch. 204, 2007 N.J.
Laws 1427.
207
In the wake of People v. LaValle, 817 N.E. 2d 341 (N.Y. 2004), a decision by the
state’s high court that struck as unconstitutional the state’s death penalty statute, the chairs of
three standing committees of the Assembly—the Committee on Codes, the Committee on
the Judiciary, and the Committee on Corrections—held a series of five public hearings in
order to “review New York’s death penalty statute in all of its dimensions and solicit the
widest range of views possible before considering” whether to restore the death penalty. See
N.Y. STATE ASSEMBLY, THE DEATH PENALTY IN NEW YORK 1 (2005), available at
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their death penalty systems. Some studies have focused on the error rate
and protective process afforded to those wrongfully convicted; some have
asked searching questions about deterrence, retribution, and the overarching
moral justifications for the death penalty; and others have additionally
focused on the pragmatic question of cost.211 Some commentators have
noted a shift in the debate over the death penalty toward a frank
consideration of cost.212
http://assembly.state.ny.us/comm/Codes/20050403/deathpenalty.pdf.
The committees
undertook “to review whether the death penalty should be enacted not only through the
prism of our moral, ethical and legal beliefs, but with the benefit of the real-world
experience which the past nine years of practice in New York has given us.” Id. at 2. No
recommendation was made in the report; the legislature has not acted to reinstate the death
penalty to date.
208
The Legislative Research Commission, the general-purpose study group of North
Carolina’s legislature, undertook a study, through a special committee, on the role of race
and mental retardation in the state’s death penalty system at the direction of the state senate.
Studies Act of 1999, Ch. S.L. 1999-395 § 2.1(11)(a)-(b), 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 1564, 1568.
The Capital Punishment-Mentally Retarded and Race Basis Committee recommended the
adoption of legislation barring the death penalty for the mentally retarded and recommended
that the legislature enact a moratorium on the death penalty for further evaluation of
potential racial bias in the death penalty’s administration. See LEG. RES. COMM’N, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: MENTALLY RETARDED AND RACE BASIS 27-28 (2001), available at
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/DocumentSites/browseDocSite.asp?nID=1
(follow
“Study Reports to the 2001 NCGA” hyperlink; then follow “Legislative Research
Committee (LRC) Study Reports '01”; then follow “Capital Punishment - Mentally Retarded
and Race Basis (LRC)”).
209
In 2007, the Tennessee General Assembly created the Special Committee to Study the
Administration of the Death Penalty and directed it “to study, receive testimony, deliberate
upon, and make recommendations for public policy designed to provide fairness and
accuracy in the application of capital punishment” at “all stages of the capital process.” Act
of June 27, 2007, ch. 549, §§ 1-7, 2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1. The creation of this committee
followed on the heels of a report from the state comptroller, prepared at the request of the
House Judiciary Committee, finding that the costs of death penalty cases are greater than
non-death first-degree murder cases. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, STATE OF TENN.
COMPTROLLER OF THE TREAS., TENNESSEE’S DEATH PENALTY: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES
48-49 (2004) (hereinafter TENNESSEE REPORT), available at http://www.tba.org/Sections/
CriminalJustice/TabD(1).pdf.
210
In late 2000, the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission unanimously
recommended the formation of a subcommittee to study capital punishment in Virginia. See
JOINT LEG. AUDIT AND REV. COMM’N, VA GEN. ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF VIRGINIA’S SYSTEM
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2001) (Commission Draft), available at http://jlarc.state.va.us/
meetings/December01/capital.pdf. The Commission focused its inquiry on two elements of
Virginia’s system: the use of prosecutorial discretion and judicial review of death sentences
in state courts. Id. at i.
211
See, e.g., CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 199, at 10.
212
See, e.g., Steve Mills, States Weigh Cost of Capital Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2009, at A15 (“Debate over the death penalty has undergone shifts over the years. During
the last decade, the discussion has focused on accuracy and fairness, with exonerations of
dozens of death row inmates sparking calls for reform and abolition. Now, with the nation’s
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This wave of self-study on the part of the states supports the idea that
states as criminal justice actors are engaged in a dynamic process with
respect to criminal justice. Even when a part of this debate is necessitated
by fiscal concern, the process of regular assessment of the cost of certain
criminal justice programs surely provides the states with opportunities to
reaffirm, modify, or disavow prior policy choices. It is also true that focus
on an issue such as cost may provide cause for a discussion that evolves
beyond its original parameters with a salutary effect. For example, states
such as Tennessee and New Jersey incorporated discussions of noneconomic costs in their studies of capital punishment, including intangible
effects on jurors, judges, and family members of the parties.213
In contrast, cost does not appear to factor into the federal decision
about whether to charge a case capitally. In response to a congressional
request for information about the average and median total cost to the
federal government of a capital prosecution versus prosecution of the
defendant on non-capital charges,214 the response under Attorney General
Ashcroft was that “[t]he Department does not track or attempt to attribute
specific sums to the capital review process.”215 Indeed, when the national

economy slumping, the issue is cost.”); Editorial, High Cost of Death Row, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2009, at A22 (noting trend of states reexamining death penalty over issue of cost of
administration).
213
See TENNESSEE REPORT, supra note 209, at iii-iv (“First-degree murder causes
emotional stress and pain for jurors, the victim’s family, and the defendant’s family.
Although any traumatic trial may cause stress, the pressure may be at its peak during capital
trials. Jurors serving on traumatic trials are six times more likely to suffer from symptoms of
depression than jurors serving on non-capital trials. While many victims’ families seek
retribution or closure in an execution, others renounce the death penalty as causing more
suffering to themselves and others. Defendants’ family members may face shame and social
isolation from media coverage or health problems from stress related conditions.”). The
New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission specifically considered the psychological and
emotional costs of capital punishment, including “the adverse effects of executions on third
parties: judges, jurors, judicial staff, correctional staff, journalists, clergy and spiritual
advisors, as well as the families of the victim and the families of the condemned inmate.”
NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 206, at 34.
214
When Attorney General John Ashcroft promulgated the DOJ’s revised policy on
capital cases, Senator Russ Feingold asked, “What steps does the Department take to track
the monetary cost to the U.S. Government of seeking the Federal death penalty in deatheligible cases? Please provide the average and median total cost (including investigative
costs) to the Justice Department of seeking the death penalty in death-eligible cases between
2001 and 2006. Please also provide information on the average and median total cost
(including investigative costs) to the Justice Department should an otherwise death-eligible
case instead be brought as a non-capital case (i.e. where life without parole is sought).”
Federal Death Penalty Hearing, supra note 34, at 60 (responses of Department of Justice to
questions submitted by Senator Feingold).
215
Id. at 60-61.
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legislature reacted to calls from President George H. W. Bush216 and
President Bill Clinton217 to reenact and later to expand the federal death
penalty, the ensuing debates in most instances assumed the legitimacy of
the penalty, argued for its appropriateness in the instance of certain
crimes,218 or exhibited a blanket moral opposition to the death penalty.219
The debate did not focus on the cost or benefit of a death penalty regime
that would be broadly applicable to almost any murder occurring in the
United States.220 This is not to say that the federal government engages in
no review of its criminal justice policies, or that it is completely insensitive
to cost.221 However, the level of dialogue currently existing at the state
level is unmatched.

216

President Bush challenged Congress to pass anti-crime legislation, including a
reinstatement of the federal death penalty, within one hundred days of a March 11, 1991
address. See 137 CONG. REC. S18,664-02 (1991) (statement of Sen. Dole).
217
President Clinton pressured Congress to pass his crime bill, which contained death
penalty provisions. See John Aloysius Farrell, Clinton Seeking Public Support for Crime
Bill, BOST. GLOBE, Aug. 16, 1994, at 3; Christopher Hanson, House Adopts Crime Bill;
Clinton Forced to Muster GOP Support for Passage, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug.
22, 1994, at A1.
218
See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S2408 (1993) (statement of Sen. D’Amato) (referring to
recent bombing of the World Trade Center and arguing that “we should have a death penalty
for these kinds of savage acts”).
219
See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S2226 (1994) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (“I oppose the
death penalty because I believe that government-sponsored killing in all of its forms is
immoral. . . . When human beings attempt to take on authority that only our Creator
possesses they are doomed to failure.”) (augmenting record with statement of Justice
Blackmun in Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari)).
220
Even when the possible deterrent effects of the death penalty are referenced, it is
often in support of authorizing the death penalty for a specific offense, rather than in relation
to the panoply of offenses for which the federal death penalty is available. See, e.g., 140
CONG. REC. S1820-01 (1994) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Senator Hatch invoked the example
of Aldrich Ames, accused of selling state secrets to the Soviet Union, to argue for the death
penalty for crimes of treason and espionage: “when a potential turncoat calculates whether
he will betray his country for profit, the prospect that he or she may be sent to the electric
chair should be part of his or her calculation. The death penalty is a strong deterrent to such
crimes. For crimes like espionage and treason for profit, the likelihood of such a crime being
committed will be diminished if the potential punishment includes the death penalty. This is
a price some criminals will not want to pay for a new Jaguar.”
221
For example, the Senate has held a hearing on, among other things, the racial and
geographical disparities in the federal death penalty system. See Racial and Geographic
Disparities in the Federal Death Penalty System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. (2001).
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D. CONCLUSIONS

This section does not suggest that the states and federal government
must have identical concerns in administering criminal justice in general or
the death penalty in particular. Quite the opposite. The differences in
institutional capacities ought to be recognized, especially in light of the
different purposes of federal criminal law and state criminal law.
Although the mode of promulgating state criminal justice legislation is
by no means free from the same types of interest group pressures that lead
to an overrepresentation in the national political process of those seeking to
increase criminal justice penalties,222 the institutional factors discussed
herein dictate that states are more accountable to the people than is the
federal government in the realm of criminal justice. Without suggesting a
particular outcome with respect to criminal justice or the death penalty, it is
possible that it may be normatively preferable within our dual federal
system to allocate especially the most controversial aspects of criminal
justice administration to the states. A fundamental principle of our
constitutional design is that “keeping the government close to the
individual” will enhance the institutions of representative democracy.223 As
one scholar noted,
[S]tates have an abiding interest in defining criminal conduct and in enforcing their
criminal code. State criminal law is written and enforced by elected officials who are
closer to the community than are their federal counterparts. Consequently, state

222
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 378-79 (1974) (terming unwillingness of lawmakers to commit “political suicid[e]” by
enacting protections for criminals “legislative default”). However, the confluence of
legislative hesitancy posited by process theory, and the phenomenon that the majority of
citizens imagine themselves as the victims (rather than perpetrators) of crime, means that the
“overwhelming preponderance of political incentives favor unrestricted enforcement of the
criminal law, even if this means abusive police methods or convicting the innocent.” Donald
A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice, 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1081 (1993). Predicting from this model, one might expect to see
few substantive or procedural criminal laws, because the benefits of such legislation are
widely dispersed. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 469, 474 (1996). Process theory posits that legislatures are not sensitive to protecting
the rights of those accused of crimes. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to
Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 766 (1991) (arguing that judicial supervision
of criminal procedure law substitutes for legislative rulemaking because all segments of
society are not equally likely to come into contact with the criminal justice system). Public
choice theory posits that the political process results in overrepresentation of the interests of
well-organized but non-majoritarian groups in the legislative process. See generally Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
223
Lino A. Graglia, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 761, 761 (2008).
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criminal law is more likely to reflect the values and mores of state residents than is the
224
uniform regulation that results from federal legislation.

V. THE EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY
ON STATE ACTORS
The foregoing section isolated the state and federal governments as
criminal justice actors and, viewing them in isolation from one another,
considered variations in their institutional features and the ways in which
these variations might impact their capacity to set criminal justice policy in
general and with respect to capital punishment in particular. However,
these two levels of government do not operate in isolation from one
another. This section examines the impact of the federal death penalty on
criminal justice actors at the state level. The potential for federal capital
prosecution across the nation threatens to seriously undermine the ability of
states to make reasoned policy choices for the benefit of their citizenry, as
examined in Part V.A; the ability of local prosecutors to remain accountable
for their charging decisions, as examined in Part V.B; and the capacity of
local juries to breathe contemporary values into the substance of the law, as
examined in Part V.C. The capacity for obscuring local preferences and
undermining the role of capital juries is particularly at odds with the Eighth
Amendment requirement that death sentences be the result of channeled
discretion and free from arbitrariness or unconstrained emotion.
Given the relatively small number of federal criminal prosecutions
annually, the notion that the federal government will dictate capital
punishment policy across the nation is not realistic. However, in the
instigation of virtually every capital trial, there will be numerous occasions,
discussed infra, in which federal rule will supplant local policies and
practices. The absolute number of these instances might today be relatively
low, yet they are significant in their capacity to weaken accountability of
state policymakers.
A. THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY, DECREASED STATE LEGISLATIVE
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF LOCAL
PREFERENCES

Even though a primary motivating factor in the centralized capital
charging policies is the attainment of national uniformity in law
enforcement,225 in most practical senses this goal is illusory.226 All capital
224

Moohr, supra note 181, at 1172.
See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
226
See Gleeson, supra note 37, at 1701-22 (discussing reasons, including prosecutorial
discretion and regional differences, for persistent disparities in federal sentencing outcomes).
225
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trials, even those conducted in federal court by federal prosecutors, will
have effects that are primarily local. That crime and its prosecution will
remain tethered to a specific locality is inscribed in the Constitution. The
Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement guarantees that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law.”227 Current federal law provides for venue in criminal cases “in a
district where the offense was committed.”228 Thus, the jury will be drawn
entirely from within the state, and the family members of the victim and
accused are likely to reside within the state. The defense lawyers,
especially if the defendant is indigent, will be drawn from the local
community within the state, and the judge that hears the case will reside
within the state. Likewise, local newspapers and media outlets will cover
the trial, guaranteeing that the prosecution will be an event in the
consciousness of state and local residents. Lastly, federal law requires
states to carry out the execution of a federal prisoner in certain instances.229
If a state acts, as have New Jersey and New Mexico, to abolish the
death penalty, it has reached a policy conclusion that is against the weight
of special interests and reflects the determination that the death penalty is
not justifiable in light of its costs. In the event that the action abolishing (or
declining to enact or reenact) a death penalty regime was premised on a
consideration of intangible costs, the state is without recourse should the
227

U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 18.
229
18 U.S.C. § 3596 (a) (2006). A federal judge rejected a claim that this provision of
the Federal Death Penalty Act violates the Tenth Amendment. In United States v. Taveras,
No. 04-156, 2006 WL 473773 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006), Judge Weinstein of the Eastern
District of New York noted that although the Tenth Amendment forbids the
“commandeering” of state officials into federal service, no New York official had objected
to assisting the federal government in this manner. Thus, “[t]he effort of defendant to
protect an unknown state official against being compelled to carry[] out this grisly duty
shows a commendable sensitivity and humanity, but establishes no standing.” Id. at *6.
Further litigation on this issue may develop, however. A federal judge has ordered that Gary
Sampson, convicted of multiple homicides and sentenced to death by the federal
government, must be executed by New Hampshire state officials. New Hampshire, which
has the death penalty but has not carried out an execution since 1939, see New England
Conducts First Execution Since 1960, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/13/world/americas/13iht-web.0513execution.html, must
construct a facility in which to administer lethal injection according to the United States
government’s protocol. United States v. Sampson, 300 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D. Mass. 2004)
(ordering Sampson to be executed in New Hampshire by lethal injection or by hanging,
pursuant to N.H. REV. STAT ANN § 630:5 (XIII)-(XIV) (2003)); Dan Gorenstein, How to
Build an Execution Chamber, NEW HAMPSHIRE PUBLIC RADIO, Mar. 18, 2008,
www://nhpr.org/node/15587.
228
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federal government decide to seek death for a crime that occurred within the
territorial jurisdiction of the state. By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, the
federal government may impose a capital punishment regime in states that
have elected not to have one. Unlike other areas of federal regulation,
which coerce state compliance with federal policy initiatives or goals
through the spending power, the commerce power, or through its powers
pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states are not
free to decline this particular policy initiative.230 When the federal
government seeks participation in a federal program where “state residents
would prefer their government to devote its attention and resources to
problems other than those deemed important by Congress, they may choose
to have the Federal Government rather than the State bear the expense of a
federally mandated regulatory program.”231 However, with a federal death
penalty “program,” costs will always be externalized to some extent on
local actors, and the states and their citizenry will inevitably bear those
costs. This undermines the ability of state governments to “remain
responsive to the local electorate’s preferences,”232 for ultimately their
decisions may be overruled by the federal government.
The presence of the federal death penalty in state jurisdictions may
decrease state accountability in the opposite direction as well, where the
state government or local prosecutors may desire to seek the death penalty
in a specific case or as a general matter, but may not have the authorization
of state law to do so. In these instances, the availability of the federal death
penalty undermines respect for the process by which a political consensus
on the death penalty was arrived. Human-on-human killing is an extreme
violation of the fabric of civil society, and reactions to such an action will
necessarily be inflected with great emotion. In the context of our justice
system, we rely on preexisting rules of law to achieve equitable outcomes
driven by reason rather than naked emotion; likewise, our democracy is
premised on the idea that our legislatures will reflect the “cool and
deliberate sense of the community” rather than ideas or positions
“stimulated by some irregular passion.”233 We have designed our political
institutions to protect against instances in which “a number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole . . . are united

230

Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-69 (1992). In the case of such
federal advances, “the residents of the State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not
the State will comply. If a State’s citizens view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to
local interests, they may elect to decline a federal grant.” Id. at 168.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison).
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and actuated by some common impulse of passion . . . adverse . . . to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”234
It is often the case that the transient impulse of a community may be in
favor of the death penalty even when its reasoned position is firmly against
capital punishment. As former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said, in
relation to his decision to seek the death penalty in federal cases in Vermont
and North Dakota, neither of which has the death penalty under state law, “I
believe the fact the state doesn’t have the death penalty doesn’t mean that
the people of the state would not impose the ultimate sanction when the
right circumstances dictate that that happen.”235 He was proven right by a
North Dakota jury, when it returned a verdict of death for Alfonso
Rodriguez, Jr., convicted of murdering college student Dru Sjodin.236
The federal prosecution and resulting death sentence registered a sense
of community outrage over Rodriguez’s crime, but it failed to respect the
reasoned conclusion of that same community regarding the undesirability of
the death penalty. This conclusion has been reaffirmed multiple times by
North Dakota. When North Dakota had the death penalty in the early part
of the twentieth century, the penalty was reserved only for those convicted
of first-degree murder and who were already serving a life sentence on a
prior conviction of first-degree murder.237 The state had not carried out an
execution since 1905, when a hanging was botched; North Dakota only
carried out eight legal executions as a state.238 The death penalty was taken
off the books in 1975.239 In 1995, the state legislature considered a bill that
would have reauthorized the death penalty for the murder of a law
enforcement or correctional officer, and for murders that occurred in
relation to kidnapping or rape.240 The bill was introduced in part as a
response to the particularly heinous and newsworthy murder of Donna
Martz, whose sister testified before the senate in favor of the measure.241
234

THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); see also Barkow, supra note 168, at 129697 (citing Madison in Federalist No. 49 for premise that “government should reflect the
public’s reasoned preferences, not their impulsive ones”).
235
Dave Kolpack, Attorney General Visits North Dakota Law Officials, ABERDEEN AM.
NEWS, July 22, 2005, at A7.
236
See United States v. Rodriguez, No. 04-55, 2007 WL 466752 (D.N.D. Feb. 12, 2007).
237
Act of Mar. 9, 1915, ch. 63, 1915 N.D. Laws 76.
238
Frank E. Vyzralek, Legal Execution in Northern Dakota & North Dakota, in N.D.
HUMANITIES COUNCIL, MORE ABOUT JUSTICE ON THE DAKOTA FRONTIER 8 2000).
239
Act of Mar. 15, 1973, ch. 116, 1973 N.D. Laws 287 (new criminal code to become
effective July 1, 1975 listing sentencing alternatives with the maximum possible penalty of
twenty years imprisonment).
240
Carter Wood, Senate Kills the Death Penalty, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Jan. 31, 1995,
at A1.
241
Id.
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The bill was defeated by a vote of thirty-three to fourteen; Senator Wayne
Stenehjem,242 who later was elected Attorney General of North Dakota, led
the opposition.243 The next time the legislature debated the death penalty
was in 2003, in response to the murder of Dru Sjodin,244 but it had little
support even in the face of this heinous crime.
Certainly, uniform federal law supplants local rule in numerous
instances by design of our federal system. However, given the structural
features and institutional capacities favoring states as criminal justice policy
actors, there may be good reason to invest state criminal justice policies
with favor, and to be cautious in relation to federal criminal justice policies
that unseat them.
Additionally, the Eighth Amendment is especially concerned with the
policy judgments made by states in the capital arena, as these judgments
create the very substance of the Eighth Amendment as it is understood to
“draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”245 Decisions regarding categorical
restrictions on the death penalty rendered by the Supreme Court are based
in part on the way in which states have answered the question for
themselves.246 If consensus in the states is undermined by the presence of

242
Id. Senator Stenehjem argued that the death penalty was costly and an unproven
deterrent of violent crime, and furthermore advised, “We, as individual senators, need to
weigh, within our own conscience, whether it is appropriate for the state to condone violence
to show that we will not tolerate violence.” Id.
243
Office of Att’y Gen., State of N.D., Biography of Attorney General Stenehjem,
http://www.ag.state.nd.us/Wayne.htm (last visited .Nov. 17, 2009).
244
Dale Wetzel, North Dakota May Consider Death Penalty but Support for Bill Is
Sparse, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Dec. 6, 2003, at A1.
245
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion).
246
In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment bars the execution of the mentally retarded. In so holding, the majority noted
that “[t]he large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons and
the complete absence of States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such
executions [of the mentally retarded] provides powerful evidence that today our society
views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.
The evidence carries even greater force when it is noted that the legislatures that have
addressed the issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition.” Id. at 315-16.
In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars
execution of those who committed a crime before the age of eighteen. The majority relied
on “objective indicia of consensus in this case—the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in
the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the
consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice” as evidence that “today our society
views juveniles . . . as ‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’” Id. at 567
(quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316). In Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court ruled that imposition
of the death penalty for child rape where death did not occur violates the Eighth
Amendment. No. 07-343, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 25, 2008). There, in ascertaining the
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the federal death penalty, so too is the ability of states to register their
norms as part of the evolving substance of the Eighth Amendment. The
Supreme Court also looks to the behavior of state juries in locations that
have the death penalty to ascertain “social consensus” on an Eighth
Amendment practice.247 It is not clear how death sentences meted out under
federal law in jurisdictions that do not otherwise have or use the death
penalty factor into the “social consensus” existing in the state.
B. THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY AND DECREASED
ACCOUNTABILITY OF LOCAL PROSECUTORS

In states where the death penalty is authorized, a second order of
policy decisions transpires at the county level. Decisions about whether to
seek death in any one case are made by local prosecutors.248 There is strong
evidence that communities exhibit their preferences regarding the death
penalty through the selection of the local prosecutor, because even within
states that allow the death penalty, its use varies dramatically by county. A
study in the last decade revealed that only 3% of counties account for 50%
of the death sentences imposed nationally.249 The federal death penalty
rests across a patchwork of counties that composes the national fabric, each
subsidiary unit exercising a degree of autonomy within the overarching
framework of state law. The federal death penalty has the capacity to
override local preferences or undermine the accountability of local
prosecutors to the communities that elected them.
A federal death penalty agenda which seeks to initiate capital
prosecutions in jurisdictions where local prosecutors, such as Robert
Johnson of the Bronx250 and Kamala Harris of San Francisco,251 have a
existence of a national consensus on the question, the Court found it “of significance that, in
45 jurisdictions, petitioner could not be executed for child rape of any kind.” Id. at 15.
247
See, e.g., Kennedy, No. 07-343, slip op. at 22 (“There are measures of consensus other
than legislation. Statistics about the number of executions may inform the consideration
whether capital punishment for the crime of child rape is regarded as unacceptable in our
society.”).
248
See, e.g., Brian P. Janiskee, Prosecutorial Discretion in Death Penalty Cases:
Democracy in Action, 2 J. INST. ADVANCEMENT CRIM. JUST. 39 (2008) (“Variances in the
application of the death penalty statute among local jurisdictions by different elected district
attorneys are a natural and desirable by-product of our constitutional and representative
democracy.”). Janiskee further argues, “Because the prosecutor is not under the immediate
supervision of other local officials, the prosecutor has the discretion to pursue the public
good as defined by the electoral relationship between this official and his or her constituents.
These constituencies vary from county to county.” Id. at 41 (citation omitted).
249
See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 618 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
250
The conflict between the anti-death penalty policy of District Attorney Johnson and
the charging practices of the federal government are discussed in relation to the Quinones
case, supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
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longstanding policy against the death penalty raises questions about the
nature of the federal interest vindicated by such prosecutions. As discussed
in Part II, the United States Attorney Manual recommends federal
abstention from prosecution when concurrent jurisdiction exists with a
state, except “when the Federal interest in the prosecution is more
substantial than the interests of the State or local authorities.”252 One factor
that bears on the relative interests of the state and federal governments is
“[t]he relative ability and willingness of the State to prosecute effectively
and obtain an appropriate punishment upon conviction.”253 Similarly, the
Petite Policy, which applies where a defendant’s conduct already has
formed the basis for a state prosecution, precludes federal prosecution based
on substantially the same acts unless the matter involves a “substantial
federal interest” that has been left “demonstrably unvindicated” by the
foregoing prosecution.254 The Department’s presumption that a prior state
prosecution has vindicated the federal interest “may be overcome even
when a conviction was achieved in the prior prosecution . . . if the prior
sentence was manifestly inadequate in light of the federal interest
involved.”255
The implication, then, when the United States brings capital charges in
a district in which the local prosecutor evidences a willingness to pursue
first-degree murder charges but not the punishment of death, is that there
are instances in which the only appropriate sentence for a given crime is
death. Further, that even in instances in which a defendant has been
prosecuted by the state, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, this sentence fails to
vindicate a substantial federal interest.
The suggestion that there are crimes for which death is the only
appropriate punishment is manifestly out of step with modern death penalty
jurisprudence. Taken together, Furman and Gregg require that the death
penalty be imposed only under a statutory scheme that rationally narrows
the class of death-eligible defendants and permits a jury to render a
reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible
defendant’s record, personal characteristics, and circumstances of the
crime.256 It seems strange to posit that a federal interest may only be
251
It is the policy of Kamala Harris, District Attorney of San Francisco, not to seek the
death penalty even when it is available. See Egelko, supra note 20.
252
USAM, supra note 29, § 9-10.090.
253
Id. § 9-10.090(C) (emphasis added).
254
Id. § 9-2.031 (A).
255
Id. § 9-2.031 (D) (emphasis added).
256
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (ruling that the legislature
may not make the death penalty mandatory punishment for certain offenses).
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vindicated by a specific outcome when that outcome cannot be guaranteed
even in a federal prosecution. A death sentence “is the one punishment that
cannot be prescribed by a rule of law” but is instead a moral judgment of
the community as to whether “an individual has lost his moral entitlement
to live.”257
It may be argued that the outcome sought by the federal government is
not a sentence of death, but the signaling effect of a capital charge. Thus, a
federal interest may not be vindicated when a local prosecutor declines to
charge a case capitally despite the availability of the death penalty. This
rationale is belied in practice, however, by instances in which the federal
government has found the criterion articulated under the Petite Policy to
have been met even after the state sought a death sentence.258
C. THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY AND THE ROLE OF THE CAPITAL
JURY

The Sixth Amendment evinces the fundamental nature of the role that
the jury plays in criminal trials.259 Nowhere is that role more profound than
in a capital trial, where the jury is called upon to decide between life and
death. The Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence has accorded
constitutional significance to the flexibility of a jury to consider a
defendant’s individual characteristics260 and to render a decision that is
essentially a moral one.261
If in fact the federal interest is lacking, and the crime is essentially a
local one that happens to have been charged in federal court, then perhaps
the relevant community values to be exercised are local, rather than federal.
This position was taken by Judge Calabresi, who, in the case of Donald
Fell, urged the Second Circuit to consider whether the vicinage requirement
of the Sixth Amendment mandates a different jury selection procedure in
federal capital cases arising in a state that does not itself have the death
257

Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468-69 (1984).
See supra notes 60-87 and accompanying text (examples of Petite Policy cases).
259
Accord Laura G. Dooley, The Dilution Effect: Federalization, Fair Cross-Sections,
and the Concept of Community, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 79 (2004). Dooley describes the jury as
“[t]he quintessential distinguishing feature of the American criminal justice system,” and as
“perform[ing] the interrelated functions in criminal trials of rendering verdicts that reflect a
sense of community justice and giving normative content to law.” Id. at 79.
260
The Supreme Court’s rulings in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986),
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978),
mandate that capital juries are entitled to consider a range of mitigating evidence.
261
See Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital
Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 120 (2004) (“[A]s to any particular case, the law still does
and must leave the death sentencing authority free to exercise discretionary moral judgment
and to bear the responsibility for the fairness of the exercise.”).
258
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Reasoning that the vicinage requirement embodies a
penalty.262
determination by the Framers of the necessity of the jury in maintaining
local values in our federal system and in capital sentencing proceedings,
Judge Calabresi concluded that “[t]he relevant community values in the
instant case are constitutionally defined as those of Vermont.”263 He
questioned whether the normal rule of capital jury selection, which
eliminates from jury pools those jurors with categorical opposition to the
death penalty, adequately addresses the fundamental constitutional values at
stake.264 Judge Calabresi also questioned whether the imposition of a
federal capital sentence “in situations that involve predominately local
crimes in non-death penalty states may be sufficiently rare as to be
constitutionally prohibited” under the Eighth Amendment.265 Although the
circuit declined to rehear the case on the grounds identified by Judge
Calabresi, his questions identify poignant and perplexing issues. To further
quote Judge Calabresi,
In cases from states without the death penalty, the constitutionally salient values are
not just the “local” values, like the existence of substantial generalized opposition to
capital punishment, but much more fundamentally the value and endurance of
federalism itself—the recognition that we are part of a country, of a polity, that has to
266
live with both Texan values and Northeastern values.

Local juries are undermined in another significant way by this
application of the federal death penalty. A state capital prosecution that
results in a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole
amounts to an exercise of mercy by a local jury. However, that mercy can
be effectively trumped by a successive federal prosecution in which the
death penalty is sought. Such a successive prosecution presents questions
of fundamental fairness to the individual defendant,267 and it is also
troubling in its effects on the jury system as a whole. The Supreme Court
262
See United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 283-86 (2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
263
Id. at 284.
264
Id. (“For a federalism like ours—made up as it is of states whose populations hold
widely different moral viewpoints—to work, perhaps even to survive, it is at least arguable
that the values of the citizens of the state in question—not just a minority of them—be
reflected in trial juries, even in federal cases.”).
265
Id. at 289-90.
266
Id. at 289.
267
See supra notes 105-19 and accompanying text. The nature of capital sentencing by a
jury means that, even at the local level, a differently composed jury could reach a death
verdict where another local jury selects life imprisonment as the appropriate punishment.
The state would never be able to have a second chance at a death verdict, though, and it is
only under cover of a formalistic reading of the Double Jeopardy Clause that the federal
government is able to seek death after a state jury has essentially acquitted that defendant of
the death penalty in relation to the same underlying offense.
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has held that “it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on
a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the
responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death
rests elsewhere.”268 In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the jury was told that its
decision was essentially not final, because it would be subject to automatic
review by the state supreme court.269 The resulting death sentence was
deemed “simply not represent[ative of] a decision that the State had
demonstrated the appropriateness of the defendant’s death.”270 The risk in
Caldwell was that the jury might render a death sentence with the
impression that appellate review could always reduce the sentence to life,
and thus the perceived lack of finality of the jury decision prejudiced the
defendant.271 Instances of dual prosecution by federal and state authorities
may similarly prejudice the capital defendant. Although awareness by the
jury of the potential for successive federal prosecution could influence that
jury to select life imprisonment because a second jury is available if the
death sentence is truly appropriate,272 it is also possible that the first jury, in
an effort to protect its verdict, might select a death sentence. The
impression of finality is eroded when a successive federal prosecution may
essentially appeal, repeal, or overturn an exercise of mercy by a
local jury.
VI. PRESCRIPTION—FEDERAL ENACTMENT OF A ROBUST PETITE POLICY
In its present configuration, the federal death penalty has far-reaching
implications for individual defendants and for states as sovereign entities
accountable to their respective citizens. Although cooperation between
federal and state law enforcement entities is desirable on the whole,
constitutional doctrines have not kept pace with the modern reality, in
which federal and state authorities routinely cooperate. Rather, the
constitutional doctrines protect against state obstructionism, and therefore

268

Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985).
Id. at 325-26.
270
Id. at 332.
271
Id. at 332-34.
272
In Caldwell, Justice Marshall reasoned that jurors might seize upon any suggestion
that the ultimate burden of deciding a human’s fate does not rest fully on their shoulders
alone as
269

highly attractive. A capital sentencing jury is made up of individuals placed in a very unfamiliar
situation and called on to make a very difficult and uncomfortable choice. They are confronted
with evidence and argument on the issue of whether another should die, and they are asked to
decide that issue on behalf of the community.

Id. at 332-33.
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do not provide adequate protection for individual defendants faced with
successive federal prosecution.
But moreover, the presence of potential federal capital prosecution
threatens to undermine the decisions of state and local actors with respect to
the death penalty. In jurisdictions where the death penalty is unavailable by
legislative decree, this may result in local prosecutors seeking an end-run
around state law by actively seeking transfer of the case to the federal
system. In other instances, local prosecutors may seek to have a case
prosecuted by federal authorities in order to increase the odds of achieving a
death sentence, either because federal authorities will seek death whereas
the local prosecutor would not, or because the federal jury might be less
favorable to the defendant. At the most extreme, a federal capital
prosecution might be initiated as a rebuke to a local jury that selected life
imprisonment over the penalty of death.
Although the number of federal capital prosecutions is still fairly small
in proportion to the number of state murder prosecutions, there are several
reasons to think that the problems highlighted in this article may increase
over time. First, as described in Section IV.C, states are currently
undergoing a reexamination of the death penalty. It is possible that states
may follow New Jersey and New Mexico in eliminating the death penalty
altogether. The difference between state and federal death penalty policy is
at its most extreme—and the effect of the federal death penalty most
subversive—in states in which the death penalty has been legislatively
abolished. Second, as awareness of the federal death penalty’s presence
grows, criminal defendants and state juries may alter their behavior. A
local jury may be undermined in its sense of finality when making life-ordeath decisions. Criminal defendants may be hesitant to strike deals with
state prosecutors, knowing that the agreed-upon sentence may be trumped
by an ensuing federal prosecution. What began as collaboration may end
up having a deleterious effect on the ability of state law enforcement actors
to induce cooperation on the part of criminal defendants.
A judicial solution is unavailing. The formalism of the doctrines
discussed is deeply entrenched. Although general Eighth Amendment
principles favor a recalibration of the doctrines in relation to capital cases,
in practice the line between a federal prosecution that truly vindicates a
federal interest and one that is merely a second bite at the apple or an
instance of forum-shopping for a death verdict is difficult to ascertain. At
first blush, it may seem that distinctions may be drawn along statutory lines,
such that certain offenses are deemed always to touch upon core federal
interests—such as treason and crimes against officers of the United
States—but one precept of jurisprudence under the Commerce Clause is
that every federal criminal statute proscribes behavior that in at least some
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instances will implicate a core federal concern. The awkward asymmetry
between this judicial rule, on the one hand, and, on the other, a judicial rule
under the Eighth Amendment dictating that some statutes do not present a
sufficiently strong federal interest to carry the death penalty, would be
great.
The Supremacy Clause militates that this problem can only be dealt
with at the federal level. In many respects, this highlights the problem for
the states, as the federal government has not demonstrated the capacity for
restraint in this area. Federal criminal law is expansive, and there is little
reason for Congress to refrain from encroaching on areas of traditional state
concern. The Department of Justice’s internal policies recognize the
potential for encroachment, but they resort to vague and ill-defined terms
such as “substantial federal interest.”273 In practice, the standards are
malleable and subject to the interpretation of prosecutors in the field.
If one accepts, as argued in Part IV, that states are better at capital
policymaking than is the federal government, then the problem becomes
how to allow the federal government sufficient room to vindicate its
interests without unduly interfering with state policymaking and political
accountability. One possible solution is for Congress to enact the substance
of Petite Policy as law in relation to all first-degree murder cases. In effect,
then, the federal government would be prevented from undertaking or
continuing first-degree murder prosecution once a prosecution under state
law arising out of the same act has been initiated. By situating the
instigation of a state prosecution as the triggering point of this federal law,
the focus is drawn away from the results of the state proceeding, and the
question of whether a state sentence is sufficiently punitive to vindicate
federal interests is avoided.
Whereas blanket application of such a restraint in relation to all federal
criminal law would not be desirable, its application in the context of
homicide is less troubling for several reasons. First, current practice
indicates that the states are vigorous in enforcing their proscriptions on
human-on-human violence. As states are viewed by citizens as the first line
of defense against street crime, political incentives exist for this practice to
continue. There exists no potential for state obstruction in this arena, for
similar reasons.
Congress has already incorporated similar restraints into federal
criminal law in several instances. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 659, which
proscribes stealing or tampering with goods in interstate or foreign
shipments, provides that “[a] judgment of conviction or acquittal on the
merits under the laws of any State shall be a bar to any prosecution under
273

USAM, supra note 29, § 9-10.050.
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this section for the same act or acts.”274 The material differences between
the proposed capital-specific restraint and this statute is that the latter
nominally creates a race to judgment: until such time as the state proceeding
reaches a conclusion, a federal prosecution based on the same acts may
proceed. The language of the current, non-binding Petite Policy goes
further, in that it bars “the initiation or continuation of a federal
prosecution, following a prior state or federal prosecution based on
substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s).”275 Such a broadly written
prohibition, statutorily adopted, would prevent the situations faced by the
Carpenter brothers, who faced simultaneous federal and state capital
prosecutions for the same acts, as well as the scenario faced by Samuel
Ealy, who was prosecuted federally following a state court acquittal after
key evidence was suppressed. From a policy standpoint, proscription of the
former scenario avoids the inefficiencies of duplicative prosecutions, and
avoidance of the latter scenario prevents the diminishment of state courts as
a result of federal relitigation of their evidentiary rulings.
However, adoption of the Petite Policy, absent exceptions for
“unvindicated federal interests”276 resulting from the outcomes of state
proceedings, would give state courts the ability to exercise an effective veto
over federal prosecutions. As explained above, as a general matter the
abiding interest of the states in effectively and promptly bringing murder
prosecutions would obviate most of the risk associated with allowing for
this type of state dominance. However, there may be scenarios in which the
murder at issue represents a transgression of the sovereign interests of the
United States in a manner such that a federal prosecution is appropriate and
necessary. It remains true that “only the federal government can vindicate
truly national interests,”277 and when the federal government moves to
prosecute, for example, those responsible for the bombing of the federal
building in Oklahoma City, the connection between the prosecuting
sovereign and the thrust of the criminal act is unambiguous. Another such
situation includes a “crime that intrudes upon federal functions, harming
entities or personnel acting in a federal capacity, or when it addresses
offenses committed on sites where the federal government has territorial
responsibility, or when it addresses matters of international crime.”278 The
problem, however, is how to draw an exception to the statute that is not so
large as to render it useless as a limitation on the operation of the federal
death penalty. Clearly, the line may not be drawn coextensively with the
274
275
276
277
278

18 U.S.C. § 659 (2008).
USAM, supra note 29, § 9-2.031.
Id. § 9-2.031.A.
ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 47.
Id.
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outer parameters of federal power to enact criminal laws. A better method
of line drawing is to identify exceptions based on the specific characteristics
of the offense that make it a crime against the sovereignty of the United
States. For example, when the victim is an official of the United States and
has been targeted in the course of his or her official duties or because of his
or her specific relation to the United States, the interest of the United States
in prosecuting the offense is clear.279
Any difficulty in drawing appropriate exceptions may be softened by
the fact that a federal prosecution is not proscribed entirely—should the
state fail to prosecute, the federal government is free to do so. Similarly,
the fact that the United States must in some cases exercise restraint in favor
of state prosecutions does not mean that it cannot devote law enforcement
or prosecutorial resources in aid of the state proceeding.
The proposed statutory remedy would not eliminate all unfairness to
individual defendants because it addresses the federal government only and
does not place a limit on the ability of a state to undertake a prosecution
subsequent to a federal prosecution. The statute and the restraints of the
Double Jeopardy Clause still allow for this. However, the institutional
features of state criminal justice systems give reasons to think that the
potential for abuse in the dual sovereignty doctrine operates primarily in
one direction. Whereas the federal government, which is the less costsensitive actor, might undertake a successive prosecution in order to obtain
a conviction on the highest possible count or to obtain a death sentence, it is
more likely that states would decline to follow a federal prosecution even
though the law allows for them to do so.
Perhaps a larger concern arises not over the issue of fairness to
individual defendants, but from a process standpoint. As discussed, the
states are currently engaged in a reevaluation of the costs and benefits of
their capital systems. Furthermore, public accountability for criminal
justice policy is greater in the states than at the federal level. It is possible
that the least desirable outcome among the many troubling scenarios
presented in this Article is for the existence of the federal death penalty to
short-circuit or create an end-run around reasoned and accountable state
death penalty policy. This was the case in North Dakota with the Alfonso
Rodriguez prosecution. It is important to note, though, that under the
proposed statutory remedy, this scenario could only take place with
collusion on the part of state officials to specifically bypass state law in
order to seek a death sentence. Authorities in North Dakota, or New Jersey,

279

Accord Gleeson, supra note 37, at 1716 ( “In a federal system that rightly accords
great deference to states’ prerogatives, the federalization of the death penalty should be
limited to cases in which there is a heightened and demonstrable federal interest.”).
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or any other state without the death penalty could effectively prevent a
federal capital prosecution by initiating a state-level prosecution. Although
deliberate bypass of state policies is possible under the proposed remedy,
the states are not powerless to stop it. Should state officials request or
otherwise invite federal prosecution, the existence of the statutory remedy
would make it clear that the officials affirmatively sought federal
intervention. This brings an increased level of transparency to the decisionmaking process, and ultimately enhances the accountability of state actors.
VII. CONCLUSION
The existence of federal criminal jurisdiction within our system of dual
sovereignty is of special concern in relation to capital punishment. The
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has required
careful procedures by which the discretion and passion of all actors in the
criminal justice system are channeled. In spite of these doctrines, the
presence of dual jurisdiction over a broad range of capital crimes injects
another opportunity for arbitrariness into the system. In addition to creating
the potential for unfairness to individual defendants, the presence of the
federal death penalty undermines state policymakers at every stage, from
the drafting of legislation to the charging decisions of local prosecutors, and
the functioning of capital juries. This diminishes the capacity of states to
realize their preferences in relation to criminal justice outcomes in their
territory. The states are currently engaged in a reevaluation of their death
penalty systems, and the presence of the federal death penalty threatens to
undermine these discussions. A due regard for the primary role of the states
in criminal justice administration suggests that federal restraint, in the form
of a statutory adoption of a rule akin to the Petite Policy, is in order.
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